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I. INTRODUCTION
The agriculture industry in North Dakota and throughout the
United States is in a transition. Recent years have been
characterized by high levels of production and a diminished rate of
growth in world demand for food. 1 An immediate consequence of
these two factors has been a downward pressure on the
1. K. Robinson, Lecturer at the Benjamin H. Hubbard Memorial Lecture Series, Coping With
Excess Capacity in Agriculture 2 (April 11, 1986) (additional copies can be obtained from the
Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison).
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international market price for major agricultural commodities,
especially the basic grains. Congressional reaction has been to
permit a lower market price for major agricultural commodities by
reducing the loan rates. 2 In addition, Congress has increased
government support, primarily with augmented deficiency
payments, in an attempt to maintain the overall level of income for
the industry.
3
Farmers and other persons involved in production agriculture
have responded to the situation by rethinking and adjusting their
expectations as to the future. Most farmers no longer expect
commodity prices to increase on a regular basis as was experienced
during the 1970s. Few people anticipate a resurgence of inflation
during the next few years or a rate of increase in demand for food
that would outstrip the increase in its supply. Consequently,
agriculturalists no longer project increasing levels of income after
paying production costs. These less optimistic expectations have led
to a decreased market value for resources used in agriculture, with
a primary impact on farmland and equipment.
Operators who committed themselves to servicing debt during
the time of high expectations remain obligated to meet those cash
commitments even though the higher levels of income necessary to
service the debt are not being realized. These fixed cash
commitments, coupled with a narrow margin between revenue and
operating expenses, have left many farm operators unable to meet
their financial obligations. Unpaid creditors respond by enforcing
their loan agreements, land mortgages, and security interests in
crops, livestock, and equipment. The encumbered land and
equipment are often integral parts of the farm business, that, in
turn, provides the primary source of income for the operator's
family. Furthermore, farm operators often feel the situation is
beyond their control. They alone did not generate the high
expectations; it was fostered by an entire industry. Yet, current
economic conditions are threatening the farm operators'
livelihoods. Many farmers react with a reluctance to surrender
their encumbered farms and instead seek ways to avoid what may
be the inevitable.
2. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1445b-3(a) (Supp. III 1985) (reducing loan rate for wheat); see also Note,
Save the Small Farm? The 1985 Farm Bill is Not the Answer, 13J. LEGISLATION 247, 261 (1986) (reducing
loan rates will bring United States prices closer to prevailing market rate).
3. Congress froze target prices for various commodities for 1986-87. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. S 1445b-
3(c) (i) (G) (Supp. III 1985) (freezing target prices for wheat at $4.38 per bushel). Freezing target
prices while lowering the loan rate to decrease market prices results in a larger gap between market
prices and target prices. Note, supra note 2 at 261-62. Therefore, deficiency payments to farmers are
increased. Id.
19871
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One legal recourse available to North Dakotans is sections 28-
29-04 and -05 of the North Dakota Century Code, which were
enacted during the economic depression of the 1930s.4  These
statutes are commonly referred to as the confiscatory price
defense. 5 The basic theme of the statutes is to grant state courts
additional discretion to postpone legal proceedings of creditors
seeking to collect unpaid obligations when the price of farm
products is so low that a judicial sale would be equivalent to a
confiscation of the debtor's property.
6
This Article discusses some of the numerous issues and
uncertainties that surround the confiscatory price statutes. Many
issues dealing with the statutes' interpretation are without a
4. Act of Mar. 6, 1933, ch. 99, 1933 N.D. Sess. Laws 145 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §5 28-
29-04 to -06 (1974)). Section 28-29-04 provides as follows:
Until the price of farm products produced in this state shall rise to a point to equal
at least the cost of production, in comparison with the price of other commodities in
general, entering into the business of agriculture, the supreme court of this state and
all district and county courts in this state shall have power, when it is deemed for the
best interests of litigants, to extend the time for serving and filing all papers requisite
and necessary for the final determination of any cause. Any such court, in like
manner, may stay the entry ofjudgment or the issuance of execution thereon, or may
defer the signing of any order forjudgment, or may defer terms of court, whenever in
the judgment of the court the strictly legal procedure in any cause will confiscate or
tend to confiscate the property of any litigant by forcing the sale of agricultural
products upon a ruinous market.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974). Section 28-29-05 provides as follows:
Whenever any foreclosure proceeding is pending in any court in this state and the
amount of the debt is less than the value of the property involved, and when any order
for judgment will have the force and effect of depriving a defendant of his home and
confiscating his property, the court may construe further proceedings to be
unconscionable, and may delay the signing of such order to such time as it shall deem
it advisable and just to enter the same.
Id. 5 28-29-05. While sections 28-29-04 and -05 contain the substantive provisions of the confiscatory
price defense, section 28-29-06 allows courts to take judicial notice of the situation farmers are in
when prices of farm products are confiscatory. Id. § 28-29-06. Section 28-29-06 provides as follows:
Any court mentioned in section 28-29-04 may take judicial notice of the situation
of producers and laborers when prices of farm products are confiscatory, and upon the
ground of public policy may do all things necessary to be done lawfully to carry out the
provisions of sections 28-29-04 and 28-29-05.
Id.
5. See Lang v. Bank of North Dakota, 377 N.W.2d 575, 579 (N.D. 1985) (referring to sections
28-29-04 and 28-29-05 as confiscatory price defense); Heidt v. State, 372 N.W.2d 857, 858 (N.D.
1985) (same); Folmer v. State, 346 N.W.2d 731, 732 (N.D. 1984) (same). Although the North
Dakota Supreme Court has referred to sections 28-29-04 and -05 of the North Dakota Century Code
as the confiscatory price defense, the court has also indicated that the statutes contain more than one
defense. See Federal Lank Bank v. Halverson, 392 N.W. 2d 77, 81 (N.D. 1986) (stating that an
affidavit set forth one of the confiscatory price defenses). For the purposes of this Article, confiscatory
price defense will refer to sections 28-29-04 and -05 collectively.
6. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5§ 28-29-04 and -05 (1974). For the texts of sections 28-29-04 and -05,
see supra note 4.
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definite answer, although several uncertainties have been resolved
through judicial decisions. Some issues will be briefly introduced
while others will be more thoroughly discussed. A general overview
of the statutory language is presented first7 followed by a discussion
of the constitutional issues8 and the statutes' applicability to
government agencies and instrumentalities. 9 The Article then
focuses on the details of the statutes, including the availability of
summary judgment once the statutory defense has been raised 10
and the meaning of the terms used in the statutes. 11
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONFISCATORY
PRICE STATUTES
Sections 28-29-04 and 28-29-05 of the North Dakota Century
Code set forth the substantive law of the confiscatory price
statutes. 12 Section 28-29-04 is comprised of two sentences whereas
section 28-29-05 is a single sentence.' 3 Each sentence authorizes
state courts to exercise additional discretion if the requisite
conditions are met. 14 Although they are similar, the sentences differ
slightly in the criteria that triggers the law, the alternatives
available to the court once the law is triggered, and the standards
for exercising the additional discretion. 15
The first sentence of section 28-29-04 is applicable when the
price of farm products does not at least equal the cost of production
7. See infra notes 12-25 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 35-92 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 93-133 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 134-57 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 169-243 and accompanying text.
12. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 to -06 (1974). For the texts of sections 28-29-04 to -06, see
supra note 4. The confiscatory price statutes were enacted by the 1933 North Dakota Legislature
when the state was in the depths of a severe economic depression. See Act of Mar. 6, 1933 ch. 99,
1933 N.D. Sess. Laws 145 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 to -06 (1974)). There is little
legislative history concerning the confiscatory price statutes except for one comment by
Representative Herbert Swett. See 1933 N.D. HousE JoUn. 1265-66. Representative Swett stated
that the confiscatory price statutes were one of the few measures aimed at helping farmers. Id. at
1265. In addition, Representative Swett noted that the statutes required courts to take judicial notice
of the economic situation in which people were finding themselves. Id. Furthermore, Representative
Swett concluded with the idea that these laws were not to be considered a moratorium but an act of
economic justice. Id. at 1265-66. There is little record of the application of the confiscatory price
statutes during the remaining years of the 1930s, except for the case of Peterson v. Points. See Peterson
v. Points, 67 N.D. 631, 632, 275 N.W. 867, 868 (1937) (district court applied confiscatory price
statutes in conjunction with other debtor relief laws of the 1930s to provide the owner of property a
four year redemption period). See generally Vogel, The Law of Hard Times: Debtor and Farmer Relief
Actions of the 1933 North Dakota Legislative Session, 60 N.D.L. REV. 489 (1984) (discussion of Points and
debtor relief laws enacted during the 1930s).
13. See N.D. CENT. CODE SS 28-29-04 and -05 (1974). For the texts of sections 28-29-04 and -05,
see supra note 4.
14. See id.
15. See id.
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in comparison to other commodities in general, entering into the
business of agriculture. 16 Once that criteria has been met, state
courts are allowed to extend time for serving and filing all papers
necessary for the final determination of any cause.17 In addition,
the courts must exercise this authority in the best interest of the
litigants. 18
The second sentence of section 28-29-04 has four criteria that
must be met prior to triggering the sentence. These criteria are that
strict legal procedure will: (1) confiscate or tend to confiscate the
property of the defendant; (2) by forcing sale; (3) of agricultural
products; (4) upon a ruinous market. 19 When these criteria are
met, the judge may stay entry of judgment, stay issuance of a writ
of execution, or defer signing of an order for judgment. 20 This
sentence, however, does not explicitly state a standard by which
courts are to exercise this discretionary authority.
21
The third sentence of the confiscatory price statutes, section
28-29-05, lists three conditions that must exist before a judge can
act pursuant to the sentence. 22 These conditions are the following:
(1) a foreclosure proceeding must be pending; (2) the amount of the
debt must be less than the value of the property; and (3) ajudgment
in favor of the plaintiff must have the effect of depriving the
defendants of their home and confiscating their property. 23 If these
conditions are satisfied, the judge may delay the signing of an order
for judgment to foreclose. 24 Moreover, the duration of the stay will
be for a period of time determined to be advisable and just.
25
16. Id. 5 28-29-04.
17. Id.; see Folmer v. State, 346 N.W.2d 731, 733 (N.D. 1984) (section 28-29-04 allows the court
to extend the time for serving and filing papers in "any cause").
18. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974); see Production Credit Ass'n of Minot v. Burk, Civ.
No. 16903, mem. op. at 11 (N.W. Dist. Ct. N.D. Dec. 3, 1986) (noting that § 28-29-04 provides that
a delay must be in the best interest of the litigants). For the text of § 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
19. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04 (1974); see Folmer v. State, 346 N.W.2d 731, 733 (N.D. 1984)
(the court may stay the entry ofjudgment or execution thereon, or defer terms of court or the signing
of an order for judgment, whenever such procedures in any cause would confiscate or tend to
confiscate the property of any litigant by forcing the sale of agricultural products upon a ruinous
market). For the text of § 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
20. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974); See First Am. Bank v. McLaughlin Inv., 407 N.W.2d
505, 508-09 (N.D. 1987) (court denied motion to quash writ of execution had that already been
issued because S 28-29-04 only authorizes a stay of issuance of an execution); Federal Land Bank of
St. Paul v. Halverson, 392 N.W.2d 77, 79-80 (N.D. 1986) (relief sought pursuant to SS 28-29-04 and
-05 may include the delay of entry of judgment, the deferral of the signing of an order forjudgment,
or the delaying of signing of an order of foreclosure). For the text of § 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
21. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04(1974). For the text of S 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
22. See id. S 28-29-05.
23. Id.; see Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Halverson, 392 N.W.2d 77, 81 (N.D. 1986)
(defendants' contended that because the debt was less than the value of the collateral, foreclosure
would deprive them of their home and confiscate their property). For the text of § 28-29-05, see supra
note 4.
24. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-05 (1974). For the text of § 28-29-05, see supra note 4.
25. Id.
336 [-VOL. 63:331
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III. SELF-TERMINATION OF THE CONFISCATORY
PRICE STATUTES
Although there has been a number of memorandum opinions
during the past decade that dealt with the confiscatory price
statutes, district courts have been reluctant to invoke their
discretionary powers pursuant to the laws. 26 Several district courts
determined that the statutes self-repealed. 27 The courts reasoned
that they were only entitled to grant relief pursuant to section 28-
29-04, until the price of farm products was at least equal to the cost
of production. 2 Because the price of farm products had exceeded
the cost of production since the statute's enactment, the courts
concluded that they had self-terminated. 
29
The issue of whether section 28-29-04 self-terminated was
subsequently addressed in Production Credit Association v. Lund. 3 0 The
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court's
determination that the statute repealed, explaining that the
26. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Kalenze, Civ. No. 53676, mem. op. at 7 (N.W.
Dist. Ct. N.D. April 22, 1987) (confiscatory price defense is not in the best interests of litigants);.
Production Credit Ass'n of Minot v. Burk, Civ. No. 16903, mem. op. at 9-11 (N.W. Dist. Ct. N.D.
Dec. 3, 1986) (confiscatory price statutes did not operate as defense because debtor had no equity in
property, the market was not ruinous, and a delay would not be in the best interests of the parties);
Production Credit Ass'n of Mandan v. Kreller, Civ. No. 3029, mem. op. at 1-2 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct.
N.D. Oct. 3, 1985) (confiscatory price statutes did not operate as a defense because the price of farm
products exceeded cost of production); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hoggarth, Civ. No. 5935,
mem. op. at 3 (S.E. Dist. Ct. N.D. July 21, 1986) (allegation of confiscatory price defense did not
reopen judgment); Federal Land Bank v. Hansey, Civ. No. 6409, mem. op. at 2 (S.W. Dist. Ct.
N.D. June 13, 1985) (confiscatory price defense preempted by federal law); Federal Land Bank v.
Mittelstadt, Civ. No. 6-CV85, mem. op. at 3-4 (S.W. Dist. Ct. N.D. May 2, 1985) (confiscatory
price statutes terminated by their own language); Federal Land Bank v. Orwick, Civ. No. 5216,
mem. op. at 8-9 (N.E. Cent. Dist. Cs. N.D. Jan. 14, 1985) (confiscatory price statutes did not apply
to federal land banks); Federal Land Bank v. Maddock, Civ. No. 10065, mem. op. at 2-3 (S.E. Dist.
Ct. N.D. Nov. 7, 1984) (confiscatory price defenses do not apply because statutes self-repealed, they
were preempted by federal law, and there was no economic emergency); United Bank v.
Martineson, Civ. No. 34137, mem. op. at 2 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Aug. 29, 1984) (prices were not
confiscatory); Equitable Life Soc'y of the United States v. Schultz Ranch, Civ. No. 5048, Amended
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order forJudgment at 5 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Dec. 13,
1984) (section 28-29-04 automatically repealed and section 28-29-05 did not apply); Federal Land
Bank v. Ostlie, Civ. No. 36928, mem. op. at 5-6 (N.E. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Oct. 19, 1983)
(confiscatory price defense did not apply to federal land banks); Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Herzig, Civ. No. 42905, mem. op. at 2 (N.W. Dist. Ct. N.D. June 22, 1977) (confiscatory price
defense automatically repealed).
27. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank v. Maddock, Civ. No. 10065, mem. op. at 2-3 (S.E. Dist. Ct.
N.D. Nov. 7, 1984) (confiscatory price statutes terminated by their own language); Equitable Life
Soc'y of the United States v. Schultz Ranch, Civ. No. 5048, Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order for Judgment at 5 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Dec. 13, 1984) (section 28-29-04
terminated by its own language).
28. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-29-04; see, e.g., Equitable Life Soc'y of the United States v.
Schultz Ranch, Civ. No. 5048, Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for
Judgment at 5 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Dec. 13, 1984) (section 28-29-04 terminated by its own
language). For the text of S 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
29. See supra note 27.
30. 389 N.W.2d 585 (N.D. 1986).
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legislature did not intend for section 28-29-04 to self-terminate. 31
The court emphasized that the confiscatory price statutes contained
no express language terminating the statutes within a specified
period of time, as was the case with several other remedial laws
enacted during the 1930s. 31 Moreover, the court noted that section
28-29-04 could reasonably be interpreted to mean that whenever
legal procedure would result in the confiscation of property, courts
could act pursuant to the statutes until the price of farm products
equaled or exceeded the cost of production.3 3 Furthermore, the
court stated that the validity of the confiscatory price statutes was
affirmed by their recodification in 1943 and their reenactment in
1961.34
As a consequence of Lund, other issues concerning the
confiscatory price statutes must be addressed. The following section
examines whether the statutes violate the United States or North
Dakota Constitution.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Several constitutional issues have been identified as a result of
applying the confiscatory price laws during the past several years. 
35
These issues include whether the statute violates the contract
31. Production Credit Ass'n v. Lund, 389 N.W.2d 585, 588 (N.D. 1986); see N.D. CENT. CODE
S 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of S 28-29-04, see supra note 4. In Lund the debtors had borrowed
$150,000 from Production Credit Association. Lund, 389 N.W.2d at 586. The loan was secured by
mortgages on two separate properties. Id. The debtors defaulted on the loans, and Production Credit
Association filed an action to foreclose the mortgages. Id. The debtors raised the confiscatory price
statutes as a defense to Production Credit Association's action, and the district court determined that
S 28-29-04 had self-terminated once the price of farm products equalled the cost of production. See id.
32. Lund, 389 N.W.2d at 587; see Act of Feb. 15, 1937, :h. 161, S 6, 1937 N.D. Sess. Laws 299,
301-02 (court can extend redemption period, but not beyond July 1, 1939); Act of Mar. 9, 1935, ch.
242, S 6, 1935 N.D. Sess. Laws 341, 345-46 (court can extend redemption period, but not beyond
July 1, 1937); Act of Feb. 21, 1933, ch. 157, 5 5, 1933 N.D. Sess. Laws 226, 227 (Act that extended
redemption period was in force for a period of two years).
33. Lund, 389 N.W.2d at 587; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of 5 28-29-
04, see supra note 4. Although the question before the court was whether S 28-29-04 had self-
terminated, the court noted that it was helpful to review all three provisions of the 1933 Act. Lund,
389 N.W.2d at 587. The court stated that the language of S 28-29-04, construed together with the
other provisions of the 1933 Act, showed a legislative intent that the remedies provided in the Act
were to remain in effect whenever the conditions in the statutes were met. Id.
34. Lund, 389 N.W.2d at 588; see Act of Jan. 15, 1961, ch. 96, 1961 N.D. Sess. Laws 93
(reenactment of confiscatory price statutes); Act of Mar. 4, 1943, ch. 201, 1943, N.D. Sess. Laws
276 (recodification of confiscatory price statutes).
35. See, e.g., United Bank v. Martineson, Civ. No. 34137, mem. op. at 3-4 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct.
N.D. June 27, 1987) (confiscatory price statutes do not impair contractual relations nor violate equal
protection); Federal Land Bank v. Bagge, Civ. No. 8403, mem. op. at 4-5 (E. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D.
Oct. 19, 1984) (confiscatory price statutes are not unconstitutionally vague, they violate due process
of law, and impair obligations of contract) aff'd on other grounds, 394 N.W.2d at 695.
Although the confiscatory price statutes raise questions under the United States Constitution as
well as the North Dakota Constitution, the following discussion of the constitutional issues does not
treat the United States and North Dakota Constitutions separately. While the North Dakota
Supreme Court has recognized that North Dakota may provide broader rights pursuant to the North
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clause,3 6. the due process clause, 37 the prohibition against the taking
of property without just compensation, 38 or the equal protection
clause. 39 Although the North Dakota Supreme Court has yet to
consider these constitutional questions, some district courts have
ruled as to these issues.
40
A. IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
Both the United States and North Dakota Constitutions
prohibit states from enacting legislation that impairs the obligation
Dakota Constitution than those enumerated in the United States Constitution, the provisions
discussed herein have usually been similarly construed. City of Bismarck v. Altevogt, 353 N.W.2d
760, 766 (N.D. 1984); e.g., State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 178-79 (court finding violation of right to
counsel pursuant to the North Dakota Constitution but no violation pursuant to the United States
Constitution). Thus, a discussion of each issue pursuant to the North Dakota Constitution and the
United States Constitution would be repetitive.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 18. Article I, § 10, clause one of the
United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, as follows: "No state shall... pass any... law
impairing the obligations of contract .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Article I, § 18 of the North
Dakota Constitution provides, in relevant part, as follows: "No... law impairing the obligations of
contracts shall ever be passed." N.D. CONST. art. I, § 18.
37. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, 5 1; N.D. CONST. art. I, S 9. The fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, as follows: "No person shall .. be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. Section one of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, as follows: "No
state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law .. " U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Article I, S 9 of the North Dakota Constitution provides, in relevant part,
as follows: "All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law .... " N.D. CONST. art. I, 5 9.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4; N.D. CONsT. art. I, S 16. The fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution provides, in relevant part, as follows: "No person . . .shall [have] private
property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4. Article
one, § 16 of the North Dakota Constitution provides, in relevant part, as follows: "Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having been first made to, or
paid into court for the owner .... " N.D. CONST. art. I, 5 16. The taking clause of the United States
Constitution is made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1240 n. 10 (1987);
see U.S. CONST. XIV 51.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in relevant part, as follows: "No state shall . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Id. While the North Dakota Constitution does not contain an
equal protection clause similar to that contained in the United States Constitution, the North Dakota
Supreme Court has provided equal protection pursuant to § 21 of the North Dakota Constitution. See
Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 323 n.8 (N.D. 1986) (Article I, § 21 guarantees equal
protection of the laws); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978) (section 21 is the equal
protection provision of the North Dakota Constitution similar to the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution). Section 21 of article I of the North Dakota Constitution provides as
follows: "No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered,
revoked or repealed by the legislative assembly; nor shall any citizen or class of citizens be granted
privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens." N.D.
CONST. art. 1, S 21.
40. See cases cited supra note 35. Prior to analyzing the constitutionality of a statute, it is important
to note that a legislative enactment is presumed constitutional. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 1-02-38 (1975)
(presumption that in enacting a statute, compliance with the United States and North Dakota
Constitutions was intended); see also Richter v. Jones, 378 N.W.2d 209, 211 (N.D. 1985) (statutes
are entitled to a conclusive presumption of constitutionality unless it is clearly shown that it contra-
venes the state or federal constitution). Furthermore, the North Dakota Constitution provides that
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of contracts. 41 Early United States Supreme Court decisions
distinguished between the obligations and remedies of a contract;
the Constitution was interpreted as prohibiting state laws that
impaired contractual obligations. 42  These decisions also
distinguished between retroactive and prospective application; a
law could not be retroactively applied if it impaired contractual
obligations. 43 The Court reasoned that a contract incorporates the
law as it exists at the time the agreement was reached, and to
amend the law would be to alter the contract. 44 These legal
principles apparently resolve the impairment question regarding
the confiscatory price statues, because it is unlikely that any
mortgages currently in force were entered into prior to the statutes'
enactment. Since application of the confiscatory price laws would
be prospective, the laws would not interfere with contractual
relations. 
4 5
Even assuming that sections 28-29-04 and -05 did impair
contractual agreements, the constitutional guarantee against
impairment of contracts is not absolute. The proper exercise of
police power can justify a law which impairs the obligation of a
contract. 46 In Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,47 the
leading modern case on the contract clause, the United States
The North Dakota Supreme Court cannot declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional unless at
least four of the five members of the court so decide. N.D. CONST. ART. VI, S 4. As a result, persons
attacking the constitutionality of a law will be expected to "bring up their heavy artillery." Southern
Valley Grain Dealers v. Board of City Comm'rs, 257 N.W.2d 425, 434 (N.D. 1977).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 10, cl. 1; N.D. CONST. art. I, 5 18. For the texts of article I, S 10,.
clause 1 of the United States Constitution and article I, § 18 of the North Dakota Constitution, see
supra note 36.
42. See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 353 (1827) (stating that the
obligation of contract is different from the remedy because the obligation is created by the parties,
while the remedy is afforded by the government); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122,
200 (1819) (state can modify remedy as long as it does not impair the obligation of the contract).
43. E.g., Ogden, 25 U.S. at 262 (laws impairing contracts retrospectively are invalid, while laws.
impairing contracts prospectively are valid); State v. Klein 63 N.D. 515, 522, 249 N.W. 118, 122
(1933) (same).
44. See, e.g., Ogden, 25 U.S. at 259 (statute in effect at the time a contract~is made forms a part of
the contract); see also 2 B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE.CONSTITUTION OF THE.UNITED STATES:
THE.RIcHTS OF PROPERTY 272-73 (1965) (discussion of Ogden).
45. But see Federal Land Bank v. Bagge, Civ. No. 8403, mem. op. at 4-5 (E. Cent. Dist. Ct.
N.D. Oct. 19, 1984) aff'don other grounds, 394 N.W.2d at 695. In Bagge, the district court stated that
the confiscatory price statutes impaired obligations of contract because, pursuant to the statutes,
courts had the right to indefinitely postpone the right of foreclosure. Id. at 5; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5§
28-29-04 and -05 (1974). For the texts of §§ 28-29-04 and -05, see supra note 4. The court reasoned
that abuse of the.discretion by a judge would result in the confiscation of the mortgagee's rights
under the contract. Bagge, mem. op. at 5. Therefore, the court concluded the confiscatory price
statutes violated the United States and North Dakota Constitutions. Id. at 4-5; see U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1; N.D. CONST. art. I § 18. For the text of article I, § 10, clause one of the United States
Constitution and article I, S 18 of the North Dakota Constitution, see supra note 36.
46. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983)
(contract clause must be accommodated to the police power of states); Home Biding & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934) (contract clause is qualified by states' authority to safeguard the
interests of its people).
47. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Minnesota
mortgage moratorium law.48 The Minnesota statute allowed a
court to extend the redemption period following a mortgage
foreclosure if the debtor paid the mortgagee the rental value of the
property during the redemption period.4 9 The Court identified five
criteria that must be met in order to sustain a law that impaired an
existing contract. The legislation must: (1) serve a basic societal
interest and not benefit only a favored group; (2) be justified by an
emergency; (3) be appropriately tailored to the emergency; (4) be
limited to the duration of the emergency; and (5) be reasonable.
50
Applying these factors, the Court concluded that the Minnesota
statute was not repugnant to the contract clause because the
legislation addressed a broad economic problem that had reached
emergency proportions, and the legislature had tailored it to meet
the needs of the problem.
5 1
Subsequent decisions have modified the criteria set forth in
Blaisdell by applying a test which weighed the extent of impairment
of the contractual relationship against the nature and purpose of the
state law. 52 Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co.
5 3
involved the issue of whether a Kansas state law violated the
contract clause.5 4 The United States Supreme Court delineated a
48. Home Blding & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447-48 (1934); see Minnesota
Mortgage Moratorium Law, ch. 339, 1933 Minn. Laws 514.
49. Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, ch. 339, 1933 Minn. Laws 514.
50. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444-47.
51. See id.
52. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983)
(once the court determines that a substantial impairment exists, the state must justify the impairment
by having a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation); Allied Structural Steel
v. Spannuas, 438 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1978). In Spannuas the Court stated:
[T]he first inquiry must be whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial
impairment of a contractual relationship. The severity of the impairment measures the
height of the hurdle the state legislation must clear. Minimal alteration of contractual
obligations may end the inquiry at its first stage. Severe impairment, on the other
hand, will push the inquiry to a careful examination of the nature and purpose of the
state legislation.
Id.
53. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
54. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 409 (1983).
Energy Reserves involved a dispute between Kansas Power & Light (KPL), a utility company, and
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. (ERG), an oil and gas company. Id. at 403. The dispute centered
around clauses contained in two contracts for the sale of natural gas. See id. at 403-04. The clauses
permitted ERG to raise the price of natural gas if a governmental authority fixed a price for natural
gas higher than the price set in the contract. Id. at 403. Subsequently, the federal government
enacted legislation that set a price for natural gas higher than the specified price contained in the
contracts. See id. at 415 n.21. In response to this federal action, the Kansas Legislature passed laws
that prohibited ERG and KPL from considering the prices set by the federal government. Id. at 407;
see KAN. STAT. ANN. S 55-1404 (1983) (prohibiting consideration of ceiling prices set by federal
authorities). Thus, the Kansas law prevented ERG from raising the contract prices pursuant to the
clauses.
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three step test for determining whether retroactive application of
the statute would violate the contract clause. 55 The first step in the
test is whether the law constitutes a substantial impairment.
56
Given that there is a substantial impairment, the second part of the
test is whether the state can justify a substantial impairment by
demonstrating a significant and legitimate public purpose behind
the regulation. 57  Assuming that there is a legitimate public
purpose, the final question is whether the adjustment of the rights
and responsibilities of the contracting parties is based upon
reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public
purpose justifying the legislation's adoption.
58
Both the criteria set forth in Blaisdell and the test in Energy
Reserves considered whether the alteration of the parties' rights were
based on reasonable conditions.5 9 One condition that the Blaisdell
Court viewed favorably was the statutorily mandated requirement
that a borrower pay the lender the rental value for the premises
during the delay in repossession. 60  This raises the question of
whether, after Energy Reserves, a similar payment would be
55. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411-12.
56. Id. at 411 (quoting Spannuas, at 438 U.S. 244). The Court determined that. the state
legislation did not substantially impair ERG's contractual rights. See id. at 416. The Court reasoned
that since ERG and KPL operated in a heavily regulated industry, ERG's reasonable expectations
were not impaired by the Kansas legislation. Id.
57. Id. at 411. The Court stated that the purpose behind the legislation need not be addressed to
an emergency, as was the case in Blaisdell. Id. at 412; see Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 445. For a discussion of
Blaisdell, see supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Court noted that purposes such
as remedying a broad social or economic problem could justify the exercise of a state's police power.
Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412. The Court concluded that the Kansas legislation was a justified
exercise of the State's police power because Kansas had a significant and legitimate interest in
protecting its consumers from increases in natural gas prices. Id. at 416-17.
58. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412 (quoting United States Trust Co. v. NewJersey, 431 U.S. 1,
22 (1977)). The Court added that, in reviewing whether the adjustment of the rights of the
contracting parties were based on reasonable conditions, it could defer to the legislative judgment as
to the reasonableness of a particular measure. Id. at 412-13. The Court, analyzing the means chosen
to implement the purpose of the Kansas legislation in light of deference to which the legislature was
entitled, determined that the means were reasonable. Id. at 418. Therefore, the Court concluded that
the Kansas law did not violate the contract clause. Id. at 419.
59. Compare Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412 (adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of the
contracting parties must be based upon reasonable conditions) with Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 445 (the
conditions upon which a period of redemption is extended must be reasonable).
60. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 445. The Court in Blaisdell viewed a number of conditions other than
payment of rental value as favorable. See id. The Court stated:
The conditions upon which the period of redemption is extended do not appear to
be unreasonable. . . . [T]he integrity of the mortgage indebtedness is not impaired;
interest continues to run; the validity of the sale and the right of a mortgagee-
purchaser to title or to obtain a deficiency judgment, if the mortgagor fails to redeem
within the extended period, are maintained; and the conditions of redemption, if
redemption there be, stand as they were under the prior law. The mortgagor during
the extended period is not ousted from possession but he must pay the rental value of
the premises as ascertained in judicial proceedings and this amount is applied to the
carrying of the property and to the interest upon the indebtedness.
342
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necessary for the confiscatory price statutes to survive a contract
clause analysis. In addition, it should be noted that even though the
confiscatory price statutes do not explicitly provide for payments
during the delay in foreclosure, the North Dakota Supreme Court
has suggested that payments could be a prerequisite to exercising
forbearance pursuant to the statutes. 61 Thus, there is also a
question of whether the United States Supreme Court would view a
judicially mandated payment as favorably as the statutory language
in Blaisdell.
.B. DUE PROCESS
Due process requirements raise two questions regarding the
confiscatory price statutes. 62 The first question is whether the laws
violate substantive due process. The second question is whether the
confiscatory price statutes violate due process because they are
unconstitutionally vague. Both these issues are briefly discussed in
this subsection.
1. Substantive Due Process
The United States Supreme Court has applied a number of
tests to determine whether a law violates substantive due process.
Earlier in this century, the United States Supreme Court
scrutinized state laws to determine whether the means of the law
had a direct relation to its end and whether the end was a proper
purpose for legislation. 63 Beginning in the mid-1930s, however, the
Court altered its level of review by de-emphasizing its scrutiny of
the legislation's purpose.6 4 Currently, there appears to be a two-tier
test with respect to substantive due process. If a law interferes with
61. See Federal Land Bank v. Halverson, 392 N.W.2d 77, 82 (N.D. 1986) (forebearance
pursuant to the confiscatory price defense may depend upon appropriate conditions); Federal Land
Bank v. Thomas, 386 N.W.2d 29, 31 n.1 (N.D. 1986) (substantial application of the rent on the debt
may be an appropriate condition for the exercise of forebearance pursuant to the confiscatory price
defense).
62. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1. For the text of the due process clause, see supra note 37..
The confiscatory price statutes do not appear to create a procedural due process problem. Procedural
due process requires that parties to an action be given notice and a hearing to present the merits of
their case. Schmidt v. Thomas, 347 N.W.2d 315, 323 (N.D. 1984). This requirement of due process
appears to be fulfilled since the confiscatory price statutes do not diminish the obligation of courts to
provide notice or an opportunity of a hearing. See N.D. CENT. CODE SS 28-29-04 to -05 (1974). For
the texts of §§ 28-29-04 and -05, see supra note 4.
63. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (a law must have a direct relationship
between the means and the end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate if the law is to
survive a substantive due process challenge).
64. See Ferguson v. Skupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (Court stating that it will not substitute
its opinion as to the reasonableness of the purpose of legislation for that of the legislature);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 490 (1955) (Court conceiving possible reasons for
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marriage, family, or privacy, the state must show a compelling
interest for the law to withstand a constitutional challenge. 65 If,
however, the statute interferes with financial matters, the state need
only show that a rational relation exists between the means
employed in the law and its purpose. 66 It follows that because the
confiscatory price statutes deal with financial matters, a substantive
due process challenge would merely require the statutes to survive a
rational relation test.
2. Vagueness
Perhaps one of the more difficult issues regarding the
confiscatory price statutes is whether they are unconstitutionally
vague. 67 Generally, due process requires that laws give fair warning
of what will constitute a violation and provide standards that will
enable judges, and juries to fairly administer laws. 68 Restated, a
statute violates the due process clause of the United States
Constitution if persons of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at the meaning of a law and differ as to its application. 69 On
the other hand, "the test of definitiveness of a statute is met if the
meaning of the statute is fairly ascertainable by reference to similar
statutes or to the dictionary, or if the questioned words have a
common and generally accepted meaning. ' ' 70 Thus, the question
legislation that would provide a rational basis for the law). In Ferguson, the Court illustrated the
deference it afforded the legislature, with respect to the purpose of legislation, when it stated:
We refuse to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation," and we
emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the Due Process Clause
"to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because
they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought... " Whether the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert
Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours.
Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 731-32.
65. SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.4 (3d ed. 1986) (if
government seeks to deprive persons of fundamental rights, it must show that the law is necessary to
promote a compelling interest).
66. Id. ; seeGriswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (the Court will not determine the
wisdom, need and propriety of laws concerning economic problems or business affairs).
67. The due process guarantee against vagueness applies to civil statutes as well as criminal
statutes, although the definitiveness of criminal statutes is more frequently challenged. In re E.B.,
287 N.W.2d 462, 463 (N.D. 1980). Furthermore, a less exacting standard is likely to be applied
against a civil law than against a criminal statute in determining whether it is unconstitutionally
vague. In re Wall, 295 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Iowa 1980).
68. -See United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (the constitutional requirement of
definiteness is met if the statute provides a person with fair notice that his or her contemplated
conduct is forbidden pursuant to the statutes); State v. Woodworth, 234 N.W.2d 243, 245 (N.D.
1975) (the due process clause of the North Dakota and United States Constitutions require that
statutes give adequate warning of the conduct specified and mark boundaries so that judges and
juries can equitably administer the law).
69. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 39.1 (1926).
70. Woodworth, 234 N.W.2d at 246.
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becomes whether the confiscatory price statutes are
unconstitutionally vague because of the lack of clear statutory
definitions. This lack of definitions is discussed more fully in
section seven of this Article.
C. TAKING OF PROPERTY
Both the United States and North Dakota Constitutions
prohibit the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. 7 1 Judicial decisions have recognized that a
regulation that goes too far will be recognized as a taking of
property. 72 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has
noted that a temporary deprivation of property may constitute a
taking. 73  Consequently, a relevant inquiry is whether the
confiscatory price statutes, by authorizing state courts to delay
foreclosure proceedings, equates a taking of property without just
compensation.
A regulation can effect a taking if it does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically
viable use of the property. 74 Although deciding whether a taking
occurs is frequently an ad hoc factual inquiry, there are several
factors of specific importance in the determination. 75 These include
the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with
reasonable investment backed expectations, and the nature of the
government action. 76 The goal of these considerations is to
determine when justice and fairness require that economic injury
71. U.S. CONST. amend. V, c1. 4; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16. For the texts of clause four of the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, § 16 of the North Dakota
Constitution, see supra note 38.
72. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
73. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2389 (1987); see
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1949) (discussing damages for temporary
taking).
74. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
107 S. Ct. 3141, 3146 (1987) (explaining when a taking occurs). Although the United States
Supreme Court has stated that a regulation must substantially advance the state's interest if it is not
to be considered a taking, it appears that the Court has applied only a rational basis test to determine
if there has been a taking. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3152-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Nollan
opinion, however, appears to give some bite to the language "substantially." See id. at 3147 n.3.
Thus, the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution may
provide a more fertile ground for litigation then it has in the past. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. V, cl. 4.
75. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
76. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). To determine the economic
impact of the regulation, the Court may compare the value of the property prior to the enactment of
the restriction with the value of the property after the regulation is initiated. Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1248 (1987). The North Dakota Supreme Court has
suggested that payments by the debtor to the creditor may be a prerequisite to exercising the
forebearance authority granted by § 28-29-04 and -05 of the North Dakota Century Code. Federal
Land Bank v. Halverson, 392 N.W.2d 77, 82 (N.D. 1986); see N.D. CENT. CODE §S 28-29-04 and
-05 (1974). For the texts of 5§ 28-29-04 and -05, see supra note 4. Thus, if mandated, these payments
will be a factor in considering the value of the creditor's property rights.
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resulting from public action should be compensated by the
government, rather than disproportionately concentrated on a few
persons." With the foregoing in mind, it is possible that a delay in
foreclosure proceedings pursuant to the confiscatory price statutes
could raise a taking question under the North Dakota and United
States Constitutions.
D. EQUAL PROTECTION
District courts have split on whether the confiscatory price
statutes violate the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution.78 A state law violates the equal protection clause if it
provides dissimilar treatment to persons classified on the basis of
criteria unrelated to the purpose of the statute. 79 Courts will,
however, subject statutes to different levels of scrutiny, depending
on the type of right that the statute affects.80 Since the confiscatory
price statutes deal with business or commercial affairs, the equal
protection clause would merely require that the statutes pass a
rational basis test.8 1 This test has been explained as only requiring
77. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
78. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. For the text of the equal protection clause, see supra note 39.
Compare Federal Land Bank v. Bagge, Civ. No. 8403, mem. op. at 6 (E. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Oct.
19, 1984) (confiscatory price statutes violate equal protection) aff'd on other grounds, 394 N.W.2d at
695 with United Bank of Bismarck v. Martineson, Civ. No. 34137, mem. op. at 4 (S. Cent. Dist. Ct.
N.D. June 27, 1984) (confiscatory price statutes do not raise an equal protection question).
79. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). In Reed the United States Supreme Court stated:
In applying [the equal protection] clause, this Court has consistently recognized
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat different
classes of persons in different ways. . . . The Equal Protection Clause of that
amendment does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that different
treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis
of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.
Id.
80. See Nygaard v. Robinson, 341 N.W.2d 349, 358 (N.D. 1983). In Nygaard the North Dakota
Supreme Court explained the different levels of scrutiny that may be applied when there is an equal
protection challenge pursuant to the United States and North Dakota Constitutions. See id.; U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV; N.D. CONST. art. I, S 21. For the texts of the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution and article one, S 21 of article one of the North Dakota Constitution, see
supra note 39. The court noted that when a fundamental right or an inherently suspect classification is
involved, courts have required strict judicial scrutiny. Nygaard, 341 N.W.2d at 358. Pursuant to this
test, a statute will be held invalid unless it is shown that the law promotes a compelling governmental
interest and that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further the purpose of the statute.
Id.; see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (interference with fundamental right
must be justified with compelling interest); State v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621, 627 (N.D. 1977)
(same). Furthermore, the court stated that there is an intermediate standard of review that requires a
close correspondence between statutory classifications and legislative goals. Nygaard, 341 N.W.2d at
358. The court concluded by stating that when statutes deal with the rights of parties with respect to
business and commercial affairs, courts apply a rational basis test. Id.; see, e.g., McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (rational basis test was appropriate for equal protection
challenge to Sunday Blue Laws); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Williams County, 206 N.W.2d 75, 83
(N.D. 1973) (rational basis test was appropriate for equal protection challenge to tax law).
81. See Nygaard, 341 N.W.2d at 358 (when a law governs the rights of parties with respect to
business matters, courts apply a rational basis test).
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a rational relation between the classification and the purpose of the
statutes. 82 In other words, a state law does not violate equal
protection "if the classification it draws is not patently arbitrary so
as to constitute invidious discrimination and if it is rationally
related to a legitimate government interest."83 As a result of this
low level of scrutiny, extremely few statutes pertaining to business
or commerical affairs have been declared unconstitutional in the
past decades.
8 4
The confiscatory price statutes present three possible
classification schemes. The first would be that some farmers are
treated differently than other farmers based on their indebtedness.
Assuming that the cost of production is higher for operators with
larger debt, section 28-29-04 would allow farmers with substantial
debt to use the statute when it would not be available to others
because the statute applies when the cost of production exceeds the
price of farm products. 85 The second classification would be if the
confiscatory statutes were interpreted only to apply to agricultural
debt and farm properties. 86 The final classification would involve
different treatment of creditors when commodity prices are, and
when they are not, confiscatory. 87
82. State v. Knoefler, 279 N.W.2d 658, 662 (N.D. 1979).
83. Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 344 (N.D. 1984).
84. But see Morey v. Dodd, 354 U.S. 457, 461 (1957), overruled, New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S.
297, 306 (1976). In Morey, an Illinois statute made it a crime to operate a community currency
exchange without a license. Morey, 354 U.S. at 460; see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17 §5 4801-52 (§ 4801
repealed 1977, § 4837 repealed 1985, S 4842 repealed 1949, S 4844 repealed 1965). The United
States Supreme Court, applying a rational basis test, held that the statute denied the appellees equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Morey, 354 U.S. at 458. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. For the text of the equal protection clause, see supra note 39. The Illinois
statute, as applied to the appellees, was discriminatory because the classification was not reasonably
related to the Act's purpose. Morey, 354 U.S. at 469. The Morey decision has been described as the
only case that has invalidated an economic regulation pursuant to an equal protection analysis. See
Cohen, Federalism in Equality Clothing: A Comment on Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward, 38
STAN. L. REV. 1, 25 (1985).
85. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of § 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
86. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-29-04 and -05 (1974). For the text of §§ 28-29-04 and -05, see
supra note 4. In First American Bank v. McLaughlin Investments, the debtors defaulted on a non-
agricultural loan obtained from First American Bank. See First American Bank v. McLaughlin
Investments, 407 N.W.2d 505, 505 (N.D. 1987). Subsequently, a defaultjudgment was entered and
an execution was issued. Id. at 506. Pursuant to the execution, farmland owned by the debtors was
levied upon. Id. The debtors then motioned to reopen the default judgment. Id. Furthermore, the
debtors motioned to quash the execution pursuant to § 28-29-04. Id. at 508; see N.D. CENT. CODE §
28-29-04 (1974). The trial court denied the motions. McLaughlin, 407 N.W.2d at 506. On appeal to
the North Dakota Supreme Court, the court reiterated that, to reach the merits of a confiscatory
price defense after a judgment has been entered, the party must justify reopening pursuant to rule
60(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 508; see N.D. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (reasons for
relieving a party from final judgment). The court noted, however, that since the debtors did not set
out the confiscatory price defense in their affidavit in support of reopening, the debtors only invoked
the confiscatory price defense in support of their motion to quash execution. McLaughlin, 407
N.W.2d at 508. The court then denied the debtors' motion to quash execution, stating that S 28-29-
04 did not authorize quashing of an execution. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974).
Apparently, the confiscatory price statutes apply if farm property is involved even though the initial
obligation was nonagricultural.
87. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-29-04 and -05 (1974). For the text of 5§ 28-29-04 and -05, see
supra note 4.
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The first classification can be avoided by basing cost of
production estimates on the typical or average farmer, rather than
on each farmer's situation. 88 Moreover, interpreting the "any
cause" language in section 28-29-04 to encompass nonagricultural
debt as well as agricultural debt would be one way to avoid the
second classification.8 9  Alternatively, the second and third
classifications would be constitutional if the accepted purpose of the
statutes is to assist members of North Dakota's agricultural
industry during depressed economic times, and the classification
relates to this purpose.
E. WHAT REMAINS OF THE- CONFISCATORY PRICE STATUTES
AFTER A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
A ruling that any part of the confiscatory price statutes were
unconstitutional would certainly be succeeded with the question of
what remains after the offending language is deleted. North Dakota
law provides that should any clause or sentence be declared invalid
by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining provisions of
the sentence or section are unaffected. 90 It is clear, however, that
the remaining provision must be "complete and comprehensive
in itself" if it is to remain in force. 91 Furthermore, the un-
constitutional provision cannot be separated from the remainder
of the statute if the offending provision was intended to limit the
reach of the entire statute, and the provision is fundamental to the
law defined by the legislature. 92 Thus, assuming that part of the
confiscatory price statutes are determined to be unconstitutional,
the issue becomes whether the unconstitutional provision is an
integral part of the statute which, if deleted, would render the
88. The effect of basing the cost of production on the average farmer rather than the individual
farmer has not been discussed in an equal protection context. Some district courts, however, have
generally stated that the cost of production should be calculated on the basis of average costs rather
than individual costs. See United Bank of Bismarck v. Martineson, Civ. No. 34137, mem. op. at 3
(S. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. June 27, 1984); Federal Land Bank v. Ostlie, Civ. No. 36928, mem. op. at
7-8 (N.E. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Oct. 19, 1983).
89. See N.D. CENT. CooE S 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of S 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
90. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-20 (1975). Section 1-02-20 provides as follows:
In the event that any clause, sentence, paragraph, chapter, or other part of any
title, shall be adjudged by any court of competent or final jurisdiction to be invalid,
such judgment shall not affect, impair, nor invalidate any other clause, sentence,
paragraph, chapter, section, or part of such title, but shall be confined in its operation
to the clause, sentence, paragraph, section, or part thereof directly involved in the
controversy in which such judgment shall have been rendered.
Id.
91. State v. Bickford, 28 N.D. 36, 87, 147 N.W. 407, 425 (1914).
92. People v. Mirmirani, 30 Cal. 3d 375, 387, 636 P.2d 1130, 1137, 178 Cal. Rptr. 792, 799
(1982).
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whole law invalid, or whether the remaining provisions are
enforceable despite removal of the offending language.
V. TO WHOM DO THE CONFISCATORY PRICE
STATUTES APPLY
Another question that has surrounded the confiscatory price
statutes is whether they are preempted by federal law, and therefore
inapplicable to certain creditors. 93 The supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution provides Congress with the power to
preempt state law. 94 State laws violate the supremacy clause and
are therefore subject to preemption if they "conflict or interfere
with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional
or auxiliary regulations. "91 Furthermore, a state law is not only
preempted when there is an outright conflict between the federal
scheme and the state requirement, but also when the state law
interferes with achieving congressional purposes and objectives. 96
First, this section will examine the applicability of the
confiscatory price laws to federal agencies, with primary focus on
Farmers Home Administration 97 (FmHA), since it is the premier
federal government agricultural lender. 98 Finally, this section will
conclude with a discussion of the applicability of the confiscatory
price statutes to the Farm Credit System (FCS) which consists of
farmer-owned lending cooperatives authorized by federal statute. 99
While FmHA is a governmental agency, FCS cooperatives are
considered federal instrumentalities. 
100
93. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank v. Lillehaugen, 404 N.W.2d 452, 455 (N.D. 1987) (addressing
the issue of whether the confiscatory price statutes are preempted by federal law).
94. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Article six, clause two of the United States Constitution provides
as follows:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made, under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the
contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
95. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-7 (1941); see also Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,
467 U.S. 691, 698-99 (1984) (stating circumstances under which a state regulation is preempted).
96. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
97. See 11 N. HARL, AGRICULTURAL LAW S 96.01, at 96-5 (1986) (describing FmHA as an agency
of the United States Department of Agriculture).
98. See id. 5 96.01 at 96-7 (FmHA's multi-billion dollar budget makes it the largest federal loan
agency dealing directly with borrowers).
99. See id. § 100.03 at 100-22. The Farm Credit System (FCS) is operated by a democratic
process in which the users of the system and their elected representative participate in the decision-
making for the banks and institutions that serve them. See id. Furthermore, the users become the
owners of the system by subscribing to a stock interest in the system. See id.
100. See 12 U.S.C. 5 2011 (1982) (federal land banks are federally chartered instrumentalities).
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A. FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION
The question of whether the confiscatory price statutes are
applicable to federal agencies has not been addressed.""1 In United
States v. Elverud, 102 however, the court determined the issue of
whether North Dakota's one year redemption period applied to the
foreclosure of real estate mortgages held by the FmHA. 10 3 The
United States argued that an equitable redemption period of sixty
days should be given to the Elveruds, while the Elveruds contended
that they were entitled to a one year redemption period pursuant to
North Dakota law.' 04 Therefore, the court was faced with the
question of whether to use the one year redemption period adopted
by North Dakota or an equitable redemption period as the federal
rule of decision. 105
The court considered three factors in deciding whether to
adopt North Dakota's state law or the equitable redemption period
for the federal rule of decision. 106 First, the court examined whether
there was a need for a nationally uniform body of law. 107 The court
determined that there was no need for a national body of law
because local laws did not impede FmHA's processing of loans. 0 8
Thus, the court concluded, pursuant to the first factor, that state
law could provide the federal rule of decision. 109
A second consideration was whether the application of state
law would frustrate the specific objective of the federal program. 110
The court stated that the purpose of FmHA loans was to assist
farmers with limited assets."' The court reasoned that the
application of North Dakota's redemption period would not further
the policies of the FmHA because an extended redemption period
could result in lower bidding at foreclosure sales and increased costs
to the FmHA. 112 Furthermore, the court noted that North Dakota's
101. But cf. United States v. Kimball Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979) (federal law governs
when the United States disburses its funds under a nationwide federal program such as FmHA).
102. 640 F. Supp. 692 (D.N.D. 1986).
103. See United States v. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. 692, 695 (D.N.D. 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE S
28-24-02 (Supp. 1987) (debtor may redeem within one year of sale).
104. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. at 694; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-24-02 (Supp. 1987) (debtor may
redeem within one year of sale).
105. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. at 695.
106. Id. (citing United States v. Kimball Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979)).
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing Kimball, 440 U.S. at 732-33).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 695-96.
111. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 95-986, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1106, 1127 (primary purpose of FmHA is to help farmers with limited resources
become established in agriculture).
112. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. at 696; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-24-02 (Supp. 1987) (debtor may
redeem within one year of sale). The court also noted that applying a one year redemption period
[VOL. 63:331
1987] CONFISCATORY PRICE LAWS
redemption period could interfere with the United States' interest
in protecting its funds because application of the one year
redemption period would delay the government's ability to resell
lands obtained through foreclosure. 113  Therefore, the court
concluded that the application of state law would frustrate the
objective of the FmHA. 
114
Finally, the court considered whether the application of a
federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on
state law. 1 5 The court determined that application of a federal rule
of decision would not disrupt commerical relationships because
third parties having an interest in the mortgaged property should
be aware of the FmHA loans. 1
1 6
After considering these three factors the court concluded that
North Dakota's one year redemption period did not apply to the
FmHA, and adopted an equitable redemption period for the federal
rule of decision. 1 7 A postponement of foreclosure due to the
confiscatory price laws would have the same effects as those
described for the right of redemption.11 8 Consequently, a similar
could force the United States to buy the property at the foreclosure sale and hold it until the
redemption period expired. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. at 696.
113. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. at 696. The United States also contended that application of the one
year redemption period could deprive other farmers of Farmers Home Administration (FmHA)




117. Id. Contra United States v. Ellis, 714 F.2d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 1983). In Ellis, the court
addressed the question of whether Washington's one year statutory redemption period applied to
real estate mortgages held by FmHA. See id. at 955; WASH. REY. CODE ANN. S 6.24.140 (Supp. 1987)
(debtor may redeem within one year of sale). The government contended that application of the
redemption period would increase the costs of FmHA loan programs by chilling bidding at
foreclosure sales and requiring the FmHA to purchase the property and hold it during the
redemption period. Ellis, 714 F.2d at 955. The government argued that these additional expenses
would defeat the federal policy of maintaining a credit fund available to farmers at reasonable rates.
Id.
The court stated that whether state law was adopted as the federal rule of decision depended
upon whether the state law conflicted with federal policy. Id. The court noted, however, that
increased costs did not prevent the adoption of state law when the state law did not jeopardize other
federal interests. Id. The court then stated that the purpose of FmHA was to help ease the financial
burden on farmers when they encountered financial difficulties. Id. at 956. The court determined
that application of the state redemption law was not inconsistent with this overriding purpose. Id.
Furthermore, the court noted that FmHA acknowledged the applicability of state redemption laws in
its regulations. Id. at 957; see 7 C.F.R. S 1872.2(c)(1)(v)(1983) (current version at 7 C.F.R. S
1955.13 (1987)) (when the government did not protect its interest in security property in a
foreclosure by another lienholder and if the government has redemption rights the state director will
determine whether to redeem the property prior to the expiration of the redemption period). The
court reasoned that since the only source of redemption rights for the government was state law, the
regulation implicitly acknowledged that the state law was applicable. Ellis, 714 F.2d at 957.
Therefore, the court concluded that borrowers from the FmHA were entitled to state law redemption
rights. Id.
118. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-24-02 (Supp. 1987) (debtor may redeem within one year of
sale) with N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-29-04 (1974) (court may stay entry of judgment whenever strict
legal procedure would confiscate property) and N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-05 (1974) (whenever
foreclosure proceeding is pending and the amount of debt is less than the value of the property and an
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ruling is likely should debtors assert the confiscatory price statutes
as a basis for delaying FmHA foreclosure proceedings. 119
B. FARM CREDIT SERVICES
The issue of whether the confiscatory price statutes apply to
FCS was addressed in Federal Land Bank v. Lillehaugen. 120 Federal
Land Bank loaned the Lillehaugens money in exchange for a
promissory note secured by real property. 121 The Lillehaugens
defaulted on the loan and Federal Land Bank initiated a foreclosure
action. 122 In response to the foreclosure action, the Lillehaugens
raised the confiscatory price statutes as a defense.12 The trial court
determined that the confiscatory price statutes were preempted by
the Farm Credit Act of 1971 (Farm Credit Act), 12 4 and therefore
rejected the Lillehaugens' defense. 125 On appeal to the North
Dakota Supreme Court, the Lillehaugens contended that the trial
court erred in concluding that the confiscatory price statutes were
preempted by federal law. 126
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the initial
inquiry into a preemption analysis was whether Congress intended
to preempt state law. 12 7 The court determined that Congress did
not intend to preempt state law governing mortgage foreclosures
because the Farm Credit Act permitted the Farm Credit
Administration to ban states from the benefits of the FCS if the laws
of the state provided insufficient protection against loss in the event
of default., 28 The court reasoned that since Congress provided the
order for judgment would deprive a defendant of his property the court may delay signing of such
judgment). For the texts of §5 28-29-04 and -05, see supra note 4.
119. Contra 86-5 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 13-16 (Jan. 30, 1986) (confiscatory price statutes are
applicable to FmHA).
120. 404 N.W.2d 452, 455 (N.D. 1987).
121. Federal Land Bank v. Lillehaugen, 404 N.W.2d 452, 454 (N.D. 1987).
122. Id.
123. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-29-04 to -06 (1974). For the texts of 5§ 28-29-04 to -06, see
supra note 4.
124. Farm Credit Act of 1971, 12 U.S.C. §5 2001-260 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
125. Lillehaugen, 404 N.W.2d at 454. Although the trial court's grounds for rejecting the
confiscatory price defense were unclear, the North Dakota Supreme Court interpreted the primary
basis for the trial court's decision to be that the confiscatory price statutes were preempted by federal
law. Id.
126. Id. at 455.
127. Id. (citing Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369, 2372
(1986)). The North Dakota Supreme Court also noted that since federal land banks were "federally
chartered instrumentalities of the United States," Congress had the authority to determine the
extent to which state law was preempted with respect to federal land bank activities. Id.
128. Id. at 456; see Farm Credit Act of 1971, 12 U.S.C. § 2259 (1982). Section 2259 of the Farm
Credit Act of 1971 provides as follows:
Whenever it is determined by the Farm Credit Administration, or by judicial
decision, that a State law is applicable to the obligations and securities authorized to
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Farm Credit Administration with a way to avoid unfavorable state
laws, it clearly intended state law to govern federal land banks in
mortgage foreclosure proceedings. 
129
Next, the court addressed Federal Land Bank's contention
that the application of the confiscatory price statutes would
frustrate the purposes and objectives of the Farm Credit Act
because they diminished Federal Land Bank's right to foreclose its
mortgages. 30 The court noted that while the authority to foreclose
mortgages was one function created for federal land banks, the
confiscatory price statutes did not relieve a mortgagor of its
obligations, but merely allowed the court to delay foreclosure
proceedings when deemed in the best interests of litigants. 131
Furthermore, the court stated that the confiscatory price statutes
were consistent with the policies adopted in support of Congress'
goal of advancing agricultural development. 132 Therefore, the court
concluded that the confiscatory price laws did not frustrate the
objectives of the Farm Credit Act, and the statutes were not
preempted by federal law. 133
be held by the institutions of the System under this chapter, which law would provide
insufficient protection or inadequate safeguards against loss in the event of default, the
Farm Credit Administration may declare such obligations or securities to be ineligible
as collateral for the issuance of new notes, bonds, debentures, and other obligations
under this chapter.
Id.
129. Lillehaughen, 404 N.W.2d at 457. The court also noted that Congress had explicitly
preempted some areas of state law: Id. at 457-58; see 12 U.S.C. §S 2055, 2079 (1982) (preempting
taxation legislation); 12 U.S.C. §S 2015, 2205 (1982) (preempting interest rate legislation). The
court reasoned that explicit preemption of some areas of state law evidenced an intent not to preempt
state foreclosure laws. See Lillehaugen, 404 N.W.2d at 457.
130. Lillehaugen, 404 N.W.2d at 458. The policies and objectives of the Farm Credit Act of 1971
are set forth in the United States Code. See Farm Credit Act of 1971, 12 U.S.C. § 2001 (1982).
Section 2001 of the Farm Credit Act provides as follows:
(a) It is declared to be the policy of the Congress, recognizing that a prosperous,
productive agriculture is essential to a free nation and recognizing the growing need
for credit in rural areas, that the farmer-owner cooperative Farm Credit System be
designed to accomplish the objective of improving the income and well-being of
American farmers and ranchers by furnishing sound, adequate, and constructive
credit and closely related services to them, their cooperatives, and to selected farm-
related businesses necessary for efficient farm operations.
(b) It is the objective of this chapter to continue to encourage farmer-and rancher-
borrowers participation in the management, control, and ownership of a permanent
system of credit for agriculture which will be responsive to the credit needs of all types
of agricultural producers having a basis for credit, and to modernize and improve the
authorizations and means for furnishing such credit and credit for housing in rural
areas made available through the institutions constituting the Farm Credit System as
herein provided.
Id.
131. Lillehaugen, 404 N.W.2d at 458.
132. Id.; see Farm Credit Act of 1971, 12 U.S.C. § 2001 (1982) (policies and objectives of Farm
Credit Act). For the text of S 2001, see supra note 130.
133. Lillehaugen, 404 N.W.2d at 459. Federal Land Bank also asserted that the application of the
confiscatory price statutes would frustrate the objectives of the Farm Credit Act because the Farm
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VI. AVAILABILITY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AFTER
THE CONFISCATORY PRICE LAWS HAVE BEEN RAISED
In Folmer v. State, 134 the North Dakota Supreme Court stated
that the exercise ofjudicial forbearance pursuant to the confiscatory
price statutes was in the court's discretion. 135 Yet Folmer as well as
subsequent decisions 136 determined that once the confiscatory price
statutes were raised as a defense, trial courts could not allow
creditors to foreclose by advertisement. 137 Therefore, creditors
must proceed by action once the confiscatory price statutes are
raised. 138
A related question was whether trial courts could exercise their
discretion by granting summary judgment to creditors after the
statutes are asserted as a defense. In Federal Land Bank v. Thomas
139
the court determined that summary judgment was improperly
granted to the creditor when the debtors had asserted the defenses
contained in the confiscatory price statutes. 140 The court noted that
Credit Administration might make North Dakota mortgages ineligible as collateral for new loans. Id.
at 458; see Farm Credit Act of 1971, 12 U.S.C. S 2259 (1982) (if state law provides insufficient
safeguards against loss in the event of default the Farm Credit Administration can declare such
obligations ineligible as collateral). For the text of S 2259, see supra note 128. The North Dakota
Supreme Court noted that the confiscatory price statutes had been in existence over 50 years, and the
statutes had not curtailed federal land bank lending activity in North Dakota. Lillehaugen, 404
N.W.2d at 458. Therefore, the court refused to determine that the confiscatory prices statutes were
preempted by federal law. Id. at 459.
134. 346 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1984).
135. Folmer v. State, 346 N.W.2d 731, 735 (N.D. 1984). In Folnmer the defendants borrowed
$95,000 from the State of North Dakota in exchange for a note and a first mortgage on their farm. Id.
at 732. Subsequently, the Folmers defaulted on the loan and the State sought to foreclose by
advertisement. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 35-22-01 (Supp. 1985) (mortgage held by state may be
foreclosed by advertisement). In response to the State's attempt to foreclose by advertisement, the
Folmer's motioned to enjoin the State from foreclosing by advertisement on the basis that the
confiscatory price statutes provided them with a valid defense to the foreclosure proceeding. Folner,
346 N.W.2d at 732; see N.D. CENT. CODE §5 28-29-04 and -05 (1974); id. § 35-22-04 (1980) (if
mortgagor has a valid defense the court can enjoin mortgagee from foreclosing by advertisement).
For the texts of §§ 28-29-04 and -05, see supra note 4. Thus, the question before the court was
whether the confiscatory price statutes constituted a defense to foreclosure by advertisement. See
Folmer, 346 N.W.2d at 734.
136. See, e.g., Heidt v. State, 372 N.W.2d 857, 860 (N.D. 1985) (mortgagee was prevented from
foreclosing by advertisement as a matter of law because the mortgagor alleged the confiscatory price
defense).
137. See Folmer, 346 N.W.2d at 736; N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-22-04 (1980) (if mortgagor has a
valid defense the court can enjoin mortgagee from foreclosing by advertisement).
138. Heidt, 372 N.W.2d at 860. The North Dakota Supreme Court has explained that
foreclosure by advertisement is only a legal short cut which is permitted when there is no purpose to
be served by judicial intervention. Folmer, 346 N.W.2d at 735. If the mortgagor alleged any facts
which could prevent the mortgagee from obtaining all the relief sought, the mortgagee is entitled to
have his claim adjudicated in a formal judicial proceeding. Id.
139. 386 N.W.2d at 29 (N.D. 1986).
140. Federal Land Bank v. Thomas, 386 N.W.2d 29, 31 (N.D. 1986). In Thomas, the
defendants borrowed $110,000 from the Federal Land Bank in exchange for a note secured by a
mortgage on real property. Id. at 30. The defendants defaulted on the note, and Federal Land Bank
initiated foreclosure proceedings. Id. In response to Federal Land Bank's foreclosure action, the
defendants raised the confiscatory price defense. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE §S 28-29-04 and -05
(1974). For the texts of SS 28-29-04 and -05, see supra note 4. Subsequently, Federal Land Bank
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summary judgments should be granted only when there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 141 The court stated that
since the confiscatory price statutes had been properly pleaded as a
valid defense, a trial on the merits was warranted. 142 The court
reasoned that the determination of whether or not a farm
emergency existed was a material fact that must be determined by
the trial court. 143 Moreover, the court stated that if the trial court
determined that there was a farm emergency, it would then be for
the court to decide whether to exercise its discretion pursuant to the
confiscatory price statutes. 144 Consequently, the court's discretion
under section 28-29-04 appears to be in applying the law to the
merits of the case rather than ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. 
145
Another question pertaining to summary judgment is whether
it is appropriate when the value of the land being foreclosed is
less than the amount of the debt, and the debtor has raised the
confiscatory price defense. 146 Section 28-29-05 provides that it is
applicable only when "the debt is less than the value of the property
involved. , 147 Thus, it appears that section 28-29-05 would not be
available to a debtor who has no equity in the mortgaged property.
Section 28-29-04, on the other hand, does not contain language
limiting its application based on a debtor's equity in the
collateral. 148 However, creditors have contended that section 28-29-
04 is inapplicable as a matter of law when the debtor has no equity
in the collateral, and they are therefore entitled to summary
judgment. 149 This issue was addressed in Prudential Insurance
Co. of America v. Butts Farming Association. 150
moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted its motion. Thomas, 386 N.W.2d at 30;
N.D.R. Civ. P. 56(c) (court shall grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law).
141. Thomas, 386 N.W.2d at 30; see N.D.R. Civ. P. 56(c) (court shall grant summary judgment
if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled tojudgment as a matter of
law).
142. Thomas, 386 N.W.2d at 31. The defendants had raised the confiscatory price defense in
their answer to Federal Land Bank's complaint. Id. at 30. Furthermore, the defendants had set out
the confiscatory price defense in an affidavit in response to Federal Land Bank's motion for summary
judgment. Id..
143. Id. at 31.
144. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE 55 28-29-04 and -05 (1974). For the texts of §§ 28-29-04 and -05,
see supra note 4.
145. See Thomas, 386 N.W.2d at 31.
146. See Prudential Ins. Co. ofAm. v. Butts, 406 N.W.2d 662, 663 (N.D. 1987) (addressing the
issue of whether summary judgment is appropriate when the debtor has no equity in the property).
147. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-05 (1974). For the text of § 28-29-05, see supra note 4.
148. See id. 5 28-29-04. For the text of § 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
149. See Butts, 406 N.W.2d at 664; N.D.R. Civ. P. 56(c) (court shall grant summary judgment if
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law).
150. 406 N.W.2d 662, 664 (N.D. 1987).
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In Butts, the district court had determined that section 28-29-
04 was inapplicable as a matter of law because the value of the
collateral was less than the debt. 151 The district court reasoned that
since the debtors had no equity in the property they had no interest
in the collateral that could be protected pursuant to section 28-29-
04.152 On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the debtors
contended that the district court erred in deciding section 28-29-04
was inapplicable as a matter of law. 
15 3
The North Dakota Supreme Court first noted that section 28-
29-04 was applicable to land mortgage foreclosures. 154 The court
then stated that whether or not the debtor has equity in the
collateral may be relevant in the district court's determination to
grant or deny relief pursuant to section 28-29-04.155 The court
added, however, that the lack of equity alone was insufficient for
the district court to determine that section 28-29-04 was
inapplicable as a matter of law. 156 Therefore, the North Dakota
Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in granting
the creditors summary judgment. 157
The Butts decision is significant for another reason. As stated
previously, sections 28-29-04 and -05 are comprised of three
sentences that express similar, but not identical, concepts. 15 8 It also
was suggested that each sentence delineates criteria and resulting
authority sufficient to define a distinct defense. 159 This raises the
question of how many defenses are actually contained in the
confiscatory price statutes.
The Butts decision provides some guidance as to the number of
possible defenses contained in the confiscatory price statutes. In
151. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Butts, 406 N.W.2d 662, 664 (N.D. 1987); see N.D. CENT.
CODE S 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of S 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
152. Butts, 406 N.W.2d at 664; see N.D. CENT. CODES 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of § 28-29-
04, see supra note 4. The North Dakota Supreme Court assumed that the trial court, in concluding
that the debtors did not have an interest in the property, meant that the debtors did not have an
equity interest in the collateral, since the debtors did have an ownership interest in the collateral.
Butts, 406 N.W.2d at 664.
153. Butts, 406 N.W.2d at 663; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of § 28-29-
04, see supra note 4. The debtors did not raise on appeal the trial court's determination that § 28-29-
04 was inapplicable. Butts, 406 N.W.2d at 663 n. 1; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-05. For the text of S
28-29-05, see supra note 4.
154. Butts, 406 N.W.2d at 664 (citing Folmer v. State, 346 N.W.2d 731, 733 (1984)); see N.D.
CENT. CODE 5 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of S 28-29- 04, see supra note 4.
155. Butts, 406 N.W.2d at 664; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of § 28-29-
04, see supra note 4.
156. Butts, 406 N.W.2d 664; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of § 28-29-04,
see supra note 4.
157. Butts, 406 N.W.2d at 664; see N.D.R. Civ. P. 56(c) (court shall grant summary judgment
if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as
a matter of law).
158. See supra text accompanying note 15.
159. Id.
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Butts, the district court suggested that section 28-29-05 imposed
additional requirements that had to be met prior to applying
section 28-29-04 to real estate foreclosures. 160 The North Dakota
Supreme Court, however, by determining that section 28-29-04
was not inapplicable as a matter of law when a debtor has no equity
in the property, construed the two provisions to be independent. 
161
Assuming then, that sections 28-29-04 and -05 can be applied
independent of each other, the confiscatory price laws could only be
construed in one of two ways: (1) there are two defenses with each
sentence containing one defense; 162 or (2) there are three defenses
with each sentence defining one defense. 
163
VII. TERMINOLOGY REQUIRING DEFINITION
The terminology contained in the confiscatory price statutes
haunt attorneys who tread in this area of North Dakota law. This
160. See Prudential Ins. Co. ofArn. v. Butts, Civ. No. 6360 slip op. at 3-4 (S.E. Dist. Ct. N.D.
Aug. 13, 1986).'
161. See Butts, 406 N.W.2d at 664. Since the court determined that § 28-29-04 was not
inapplicable as a matter of law when the debtor had no equity in the property, it construed SS 28-29-
04 and-05 independently because it appears that S 28-29-05 would be inapplicable if the debtor had
no equity in the collateral. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-05 (1974) (amount of the debt must be less
than the value of the property involved). For the text of § 28-29-05, see supra note 4.
162. One possible interpretation of § 28-29-05 is that it only applies to real estate foreclosures in
which the value of the land exceeds the amount of the debt and the mortgage encumbers the debtor's
home. See N.D. CENT. CoDE S 28-29-05 (1974). Pursuant to this line of thought, § 28-29-04 would
define a distinct defense which could be applied in all other cases, including a proceeding in which the
mortgage was not on the debtor's home or the debtor had no equity in the property. See id. § 28-29-
04. This distinction between §§ 28-29-04 and -05 would only be meaningful, however, if the standard
for exercising judicial forebearance was more favorable for a debtor pursuant to § 28-29-05
(advisable and just) than to S 28-29-04 (best interest of the litigants). See id. S 28-29-04 and - 05. For
the text of §§ 28-29-04 and -05, see supra note 4.
163. See id. §5 28-29-04 and -05. For the texts of S 28-29-04 and -05, see supra note 4. It is not
clear whether each sentence contained in § 28-29- 04 constitutes a separate defense. See id. § 28-29-
04. In two opinions, however, the North Dakota Supreme Court appears to suggest that the two
sentences of § 28-29-04 describe the same defense. See Production Credit Ass'n v. Lund, 389 N.W.2d
585, 587 (N.D. 1986); Folmer v. State, 346 N.W.2d 731, 733 (court can extend time for filing-and
serving papers if prices are confiscatory). In Lund, the court merged the language of the two
sentences when it stated:
A fair reasonable interpretation of Section 28-29-04 . . . is that" whenever" legal
procedure will result in the confiscation of property "by forcing the sale of agricultural
products upon a ruinous market" the courts, within their discretion may act as
authorized under the provision "until farm products . . . equal at least the cost of
production."
Lund, 389 N.W.2d at 587.
In Heidt v. State, however, the court stated that § 28-29-04 did not require possession of
agricultural commodities to invoke the confiscatory price defense. Heidt v. State, 372 N.W.2d 857,
861 (N.D. 1985); see also Federal Land Bank v. Thomas, 386 N.W.2d 29, 31 n.l (N.D. 1986). The
decision focused on the first sentence of § 28-29-04, and did not address the second sentence. See
Heidi, 372 N.W.2d at 861. Arguably, the language of the second sentence (by forcing sale of
agricultural products) requires possession of farm products. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04 (1974).
Thus, the sentences have different criteria and appear to be discrete defenses.
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section identifies words and phrases contained in section 28-29-04
and -05 whose meanings are unclear. Possible definitions are
suggested for some terms whereas in other cases the amibiguity is
only indicated.
A. PRICE OF FARM PRODUCTS
Section 28-29-04 provides state courts with additional
authority when the price of farm products is less than the cost of
production. 164 A primary issue regarding the calculation of the
price of farm products is whether courts should only consider the
current market price, or whether revenue from participation in
federal farm programs also needs to be included in the price of farm
products. 165
It is unclear whether the 1933 North Dakota Legislature
intended income received from federal farm programs to be
included in the price of farm products. 166 Revenue from federal
farm programs should, however, be included into the price of farm
products because federal payments represent a large portion of
farmers' income. In 1986, for example, payments from federal
farm programs constituted approximately twenty-five percent of
North Dakota farmers' total income. 167 Because these payments
164. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of § 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
165. See United Bank of Bismarck v. Martineson, Civ. No. 34137, mem. op. at 2 (S. Cent. Dist.
Ct. N.D. Aug. 29, 1984) (considering the effect of federal programs on farm prices). Apparently the
North Dakota Supreme Court will closely follow the letter of the law in applying some of the
language of the confiscatory price statutes. See First American Bank v. McLaughlin Instruments, 407
N.W.2d 505, 508-09 (N.D. 1987) (section 28-29-04 authorizes courts to stay issuance of an execution
but not to quash an execution).
166. When the confiscatory price statutes were enacted in 1933, the Agricultural Marketing Act
was the current farm program. Agricultural Marketing Act, Pub. L. No. 10, 46 Stat. 11 (1929)
(current version at 12 U.S.C. §5 1141 to 1141j (1982)). While the Agricultural Marketing Act
attempted to control surplus agricultural products by making loans to cooperatives for purchase and
storage of agricultural products, it did not provide for direct payments to farmers. See id. SS 1, 7
(current version at 12 U.S.C. S 1141, 1141e (
1 9 8 2 )); see also R. KNUTSON, J. PENN & W. BOEHN,
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD POLICY 213 (1983) (Agricultural Marketing Act attempted to support prices
through storage programs). Within several months of the enactment of the confiscatory price
statutes, however, Congress replaced the Agricultural Marketing Act with the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 10, 48 Stat. 31 (current
version at 7 U.S.C. 55 601 to 624 (1982 & Supp. 1985)). The 1933 Act was the first federal farm
program to attempt to control surpluses by providing direct payments to farmers who voluntarily
reduced the acreage of the basic crops that they planted. See id. S 8(1) (current version at 7 U.S.C. S
608 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)), see also Harkin & Harkin, Roosevelt to Reagan "Commodity Programs and
Food Act of 1981", 31 DRAKE L. REV. 499, 500 (1982) (discussing Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933). Since the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was enacted contemporaneously with the
confiscatory price statutes, it is unclear whether the 1933 North Dakota Legislature intended
payments from farm programs to be included in the price of farm products.
167. See N.D. AGRIC. STAT. SERV., AGRIC. STAT. No. 56, NORTH DAKOTA STATISTICS 1987 at 9
(1987). In 1986 federal farm program payments to North Dakota farmers were $700,180,000 while
the total cash income of North Dakota farmers was $2,834,604,000. Id. Thus, government payments
constituted 24.7% of North Dakota farmers' total income in 1986. See id. In 1934 payments to North
Dakota farmers were $18,150,000 while total cash income was $86,164,000. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
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amount to a substantial part of the farmers' income, they must be
included into the price of farm products to equitably determine
whether a farm family has adequate resources to pay production
expenses. 168
B. COST OF PRODUCTION
Section 28-29-04 requires that the cost of producing
agricultural commodities be greater than the price of farm products
in order to trigger additional discretionary authority for state
courts. 169 The cost of production, however, like the price of farm
products, is not defined in the statute. Furthermore, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to define the
phrase. 170
There is no one definition of cost of production.
7 1
Furthermore, it is well-recognized that when defining a cost, the
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 383 (1937). Therefore, government payments equaled 21% of total
income in 1934. See id.
Records do not indicate that farmers received payments pursuant to the Agricultural Act of
1933 until 1934. However, government payments as a percent of total farm income for North Dakota
farmers from 1935 to 1985 ranged from .7 of 1% to 20.9%, with an average of 9.2% for years 1934
through 1986. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS (1936 to 1986) (annual
reports containing tables which indicate total income and amount of federal farm program
payments).
168. A related question is which price should be considered. The alternatives include the futures
price, a terminal price, or the debtor's local market price. Local market price appears most relevant
since it is the amount a farmer will receive for his product.
169. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of 5 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
170. Although the North Dakota Supreme Court has not defined the cost of production for the
purposes of the confiscatory price statutes, the court has referred to the current agricultural condition
and generally compared it with that experienced in the 1930s. See, e.g., Lang v. Bank of North
Dakota, 377 N.W.2d 575, 580 (N.D. 1985) (court recognizing parallels between current agricultural
conditions and those in the 1930s). These statements are perhaps best understood as describing the
likely situation in which the confiscatory price statutes would be triggered. Since § 28-29-04
specifically provides that cost of production must exceed the price of farm products for the statute to
be applicable, statements analogizing the agricultural economy of the 1930s with the current
situation should not be interpreted as holding that § 28-29-04 is applicable when current economic
conditions are equivalent to those in the 1930s. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04 (1974). For the text
of S 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
171. J. Lee, Calculating and Using Costs of Production for Policy Decisions - The Case of the
United States 11 (seminar paper presented at the Instituto de Economia Agricola, Sao Paulo, Brazil,
Jan. 23, 1976). Discussing costs, Lee stated:
An issue encountered early in policy-related discussions is that of which costs to
use. If a policy maker asks "what does it cost to produce wheat?" one might respond
by asking: "Do you mean the national average cost for all wheat produced?"
"Median cost?" "Average cost for 'typical' farmer?" "Or most efficient farmers?"
"Or do you want a distribution of costs from lowest cost producers to highest?" "Do
you mean total costs, including land charges?" "Or variable costs?" "Including
overhead?" and so on, ad infinitum. The response is usually bewilderment.
Clearly there is no single cost of production that is correct to the exclusion of all
others. It is likely that most of the ways of calculating production costs are legitimate
- but legitimate and appropriate for specific purposes.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
purpose of the definition must be considered. 7 2 Accordingly, the
purpose of the confiscatory price statutes must be understood to
define the cost of production. Unfortunately, legislative history
does not clearly indicate the objective of the confiscatory price
laws. 17 3 Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme Court has only
indicated that the purpose of the statutes is to "protect the farmer-
landowner. ' ' 174 The language of the statutes, however, suggests
a purpose for the-legislation.
The perceived purpose of the statutes is to assist borrowers by
providing a temporary delay in repayment of obligations during a
time when they are unable to make current payments as a result of
adverse economic conditions in agriculture. 175 Accepting that as the
purpose of the statute also delineates the parameters for defining
the cost of production. The law will not be applicable until the
economic situation for agriculture is generally depressed. The law
must trigger, however, before economic conditions deteriorate to
the point at which a delay would no longer benefit borrowers. An
understanding of some basic economic principles is necessary to
translate these ideas into a definition of the cost of production.
There are several ways to categorize costs. One way is to
divide inputs and their associated costs into two groups: (1) fixed
inputs and fixed costs; and (2) variable inputs and variable costs.1 76
Fixed inputs are those which cannot be readily removed from
productions; 1 77 land is a common example. The annual payment
required to satisfy a debt incurred to acquire land is a fixed cost
because it must be paid whether or not agricultural product is
172. A. MATZ, 0. CURRY & M. USRY, COST ACCOUNTING - PLANNING AND CONTROL 41 (5th ed.
1972). The authors state:
It is [a] fundamental axiom that a cost must be understood in its relationship to the
aims or purposes which it is to serve. A request for cost data must be accompanied by a
description of the decision situation in which the data are to be used, for the same cost
data cannot serve all purposes equally well.
Id.
173. See supra note 12.
174. Federal Land Bank v. Thomas, 386 N.W.2d 29, 31 n.1 (N.D. 1986); Heidt v. State, 372
N.W.2d 857, 861 (N.D. 1985). In Thomas the debtors had sold their farm machinery in an attempt to
appease creditors. Thomas, 386 N.W.2d at 30. Subsequently, the debtors leased the farm land. Id.
Federal Land Bank then initiated a foreclosure action on lands located in Morton County. Id. The
debtors subsequently raised the confiscatory price defense. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 and
-05 (1974). Federal Land Bank contended that since the debtors leased the land, they were not
"farmer-landowners" and therefore could not raise the confiscatory price defense. Thomas, 386
N.W.2d at 31 n.1; see Heidt, 372 N.W.2d at 861. The North Dakota Supreme Court, however,
determined that the term "farmer-landowner" should not be interpreted to mean only landowners
who are personally farming their land. Thomas, 386 N.W.2d at 31 n.1. Therefore, the court
concluded that the confiscatory price statutes could be available to the debtors. Id. at 31.
175. See Folmer v. State, 346 N.W.2d 731, 735 (N.D. 1984) (the confiscatory price statutes give
state courts the power to delay foreclosure in periods of economic hardship).
176. J. PENSON, R. POPE & M. COOK, INTRODUCTION To AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 126 (1986).
177. See id.
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raised. Variable costs, on the other hand, change with the level of
production.178 Fertilizer is a common example. Should a farmer
attempt to alter the level of production by increasing or decreasing
the amount of fertilizer that is applied, the total expenditure for
fertilizer will also increase or decrease. Moreover, the farmer who
decides not to plant a crop will not incur any variable costs. The
sum of the fixed and variable costs is referred to as the total cost. 
179
A farm operator experiences a profit whenever the revenue
received from the sale of the agricultural produce is greater than the
total cost of growing the produce. 180 On the other hand, a loss is
incurred if revenues are less than total costs. Incurring a loss,
however, does not mean that the prudent farm operator will cease
production. Since fixed costs must be paid whether or not a crop is
raised, the farm operator benefits from producing agricultural
commodities as long as revenues are sufficient to pay all variable
costs and a portion of fixed costs. 181 Should revenue drop to a level
at which variable costs would not be recovered, the farmer should
cease production. 82
1. The Variable Cost Approach
At least one district court appears to have defined the cost of
production as the amount of revenue necessary to pay variable
costs. 183 In United Bank of Bismarck v. Martineson the court stated that
prices are not confiscatory if the amounts received for farm
commodities reflect positively on the balance sheet.18 5 The court
explained that some farm operators increase their net worth or
equity as a consequence of farming their land while other operators
178. Id. at 126, 128.
179. Id. at 126.
180. See id. at 133.
181. See id. at 136, 138.
182. Id.
183. See Production Credit Ass'n of Mandan v. Kreller, Civ. No. 3029, mem. op. at 1-2
(S.Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Oct. 2, 1986); United Bank of Bismarck v. Martineson, Civ. No. 34137,
mem. op. at 102 (S.Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Aug. 29, 1984). In Kreller, the court appeared to be defining
cost of production as the amount of revenue needed to pay variable costs when the court stated:
[M]ost farmers can with most crops make a profit upon selling the crops planted by
them, provided costs of production do not include embedded land costs which exist
whether or not the crop is planted .... Although crop prices could be and should be
higher, all farmers have been better off planting crops than they would have been if
they had not done so.
Kreller, mem. op. at 1-2.
184. Civ. No. 34137, mem. op. (S.Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Aug. 29, 1984).
185. United Bank of Bismarck v. Martineson, Civ. No. 34137, mem. op. at 2 (S.Cent. Dist. Ct.
N.D. Aug. 29, 1984). The court stated that there is a positive result on the balance sheet whenever
farmers are better off planting crops than letting the land lay idle. Id.
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suffer a decrease in their net worth. 186 The court then stated that as
long as operating the land produces a gain in net worth or a slower
loss in equity than if the land was idle, prices are not
confiscatory." 7
This concept can be restated into terms of variable and fixed
costs. A farmer who does not plant will reduce the operation's net
worth on a balance sheet by the amount of fixed costs for- that
year.188 The balance sheet of a farmer who plants a crop or raises
livestock will be affected by the same magnitude if revenue exactly
equals variable costs.' 8 9 A corollary is that net worth will decrease"
faster by planting crops rather than not planting crops only if
revenue is less than variable costs. 90 Therefore, in order for prices
to be confiscatory pursuant to the court's analysis in Martineson,
revenue would have to be less than variable costs.
This definition would be illogical and inconsistent with the
perceived purpose of the confiscatory price statutes. Defining costs
of production as variable costs would allow forebearance pursuant
to section 28-29-04 only if the farm operator could not raise
agricultural products sufficient to repay variable costs. 191 Thus, the
court would allow farmers to continue operating even though the
resulting revenue was insufficient to pay variable costs. This is
contrary to the basic economic theory explained above, in which all
prudent business persons cease operation when revenue drops to a
level less than variable costs. Adoption of this definition of cost of
production would be inappropriate because courts would
encourage farmers to continue operation when common sense
dictates that the business should be terminated.
2. The Opportunity Cost Approach
The opposite ,of defining cost of production in terms of variable
costs would be to include all economic costs in the definition. The
concept of economic cost encompasses not only variable and fixed
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Fixed costs must be paid whether or not there is production. Therefore, a farmer who does
not produce must use equity to pay the amount of fixed costs.
189. The balance sheet of a farmer who receives revenue equal to variable costs will be affected
the same as if no crops were planted. In either case, equity would have to be used to pay all fixed
costs.
190. If income is less than variable costs, the balance sheet would be negitively affected because
the farmer would have to use equity to pay fixed costs plus the portion of variable costs that iire not
covered by revenues.
191. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974) (applicable when cost of production exceeds farm
prices). For the text of S 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
362 [VOL. 63:331
CONFISCATORY PRICE LAWS
costs, but also opportunity costs. 192 Opportunity cost is the rate of
return that would have been received had resources owned by the
farm operator been invested in another business rather than used
on the farm. 193 For example, the opportunity cost of a landowner
farming his or her land is the amount of money that would have
been' received if the land had been rented to a neighbor. Thus, by
including opportunity costs, the cost of production would be the
total of all variable and fixed costs plus an amount equal to what
would have been received if resources owned by the farmer would
have been used differently.
There are several reasons why economic costs should not be
adopted as the definition for cost of production. First, agriculture is
a competitive industry which means in the long run revenue will
equal costs. 194 This indicates that there will be times when revenue
is less than total economic costs in order to average out years when
revenue exceeds economic costs. Consequently, economic cost in
excess of revenue is not unexpected nor does it forecast the demise
of the agricultural industry.
Second, including opportunity cost as a component of
production costs adds rigidity to the market value of assets owned
by the farm operator. The market price of assets owned by the farm
operator reflects the earning capacity of the asset; the greater the
expected future income, the higher price for the asset.' 95 Since
including opportunity costs into the cost of production would
require that assets earn income equal to the amount of revenue that
would have been generated if the assets were alternatively invested,
the court would have to set the rate of return for farmers' assets to
determine the cost of production. By establishing the earning
capacity of the asset, the market price of the asset would also be
determined. The disadvantage of an inflexible price for an asset is
that the market price will not reflect a change in the value of the
asset which occurs after the rate of return is established.
Finally, people operate a business for the wealth it generates
192. SeeJ. DOLL & F. ORAZEM, PRODUCTION ECONOMICS: THEORY WITH APPLICATION 81-82 (2d
ed. 1978) (discussing opportunity cost as part of cost of production).
193. Id. at82.
194. See generally H. HALCROW, ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE 143-46 (1980) (explaining
economics of competitive firm in the long run). One characteristic of a competitive industry is the
ease with which firms may enter and exit. See C. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS
AND POLICIES 560-63 (10th ed. 1987). Additional firms will enter a competitive industry that is
enjoying substantial profits whereas firms will exit the industry if they are incurring losses. See id.
Long run equilibrium for a competitive industry will have no extra profit nor persistent losses; that
is, revenues will equal costs. See id.
195. R. KNUTSON, J. PENN & W. BOEHN, AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD POLICY 171 (1983). The
process by which the earning potential of an asset is converted into the value of the asset is referred to
as capitaliiation. Id.
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and the satisfaction it provides. If outdoor activities and proximity
to nature is important to someone, that person will likely continue
to farm even though the business does not generate the same level
of income which the person would receive in other employment.
Economic theory reflects that willingness to exchange income for
amenities by reducing that person's opportunity costs. 196
Therefore, even if economic cost is accepted as the definition for
cost of production, the estimation may need to reflect a lower rate
of return for capital and labor to reflect the satisfaction obtained by
operating a farm.
3. The Cost Accounting Approach
Cost of production for the purpose of the confiscatory price
laws must entail more than variable costs and less than economic
costs. One definition that falls within this range is the cost of
production as generally recognized by the accounting profession.197
Pursuant to this definition, cost of production would include
variable costs as well as a depreciation allowance for fixed assets. 198
This definition, however, would not include principal payments on
debts, capital expenditures, or opportunity costs.
Since depreciation is a noncash expense, 99 including it in the
cost of production assures that a farmer will have some cash
remaining after paying cash costs as long as revenue at least equals
the cost of production. This, however, does not assure that the
farmer's cash income will be sufficient to meet all cash obligations.
Ideally, this remaining cash should be reinvested to maintain and
replace depreciable assets. If the income is not used for this
purpose, fixed assets will expire which, in turn, will result in
reduced efficiency and the eventual demise of the farm. Since this
remaining cash must be used for fixed assets, there might not be
sufficient income to cover other cash obligations such as a family
living allowance and principal payments on debts, which are not
included in the cost of production. Therefore, this definition of cost
196. See generally R. LEFTWICH & R. ECKERT, THE.PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION
150-79 (8th ed. 1982) (discussing costs).
197. Cost of production as recognized by the accounting profession is similar to cost for the
purpose of federal income tax. See D. SMITH & J. BUTTERS, TAXABLE AND BUSINESS INCOME 9-10
(1949). The two definitions, however, differ slightly because accountants are likely to use the accrual
method of accounting, whereas farmers compute income tax liability using the cash method. The two
methods also vary in the method employed to calculate depreciation.
198. See generally A. MATZ, 0. CURRY & M. USRY, COST ACCOUNTING - PLANNING AND CONTROL
(5th ed. 1972) (discussing cost accounting).
199. J. DOLL & F. ORAZEM, supra note 192, at 81. Noncash costs consist of depreciation and
opportunity costs. Id.
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of production does not assure that forbearance pursuant to the
confiscatory price statutes would aid the farmer because there is no
guarantee that cash obligations necessary for survival of the farm
business will be met.
4. An Alternative Approach
Another alternative for calculating the cost of production is
based on the cash outflows of the typical North Dakota farm. This
definition would require a description of the typical farm's acreage,
indebtedness, interest rates, and repayment schedule.
The cost of production based on cash outflows would include
an estimate' of all variable costs and an estimate of fixed costs
which require a cash outflow, except principal payments on debts.
Pursuant to this definition, fixed cash outflows relating to land
would be replaced by the following three-part estimate: (1) average
rental payments on the portion of land that is typically leased; (2)
average debt servicing payments and property tax payments on the
portion of land that is typically encumbered; and (3) average
property tax payments on the portion of land that is owned free and
clear. Furthermore, this definition of cost production would include
an estimated family living allowance to replace the opportunity cost
of family labor and nonreal estate equity in the business.
Moreover, even though depreciation is a noncash cost, a portion of
the farm's depreciation would be included so that equipment and
machinery would not be consumed without being replaced. 200 The
portion of depreciation included as a cost would be the average
farmer's ratio of equity in the depreciable assets to the assets' value.
Several points about this definition can be identified. First, as
long as principal payments are delayed but interest payments are
kept current, the only equity the farmer loses is the amount
which results from the depreciation of encumbered assets. Second,
an income level that exceeds cash needs and depreciation
allowances indicates that at least some debt principal can be repaid.
Third, income that is less than cash needs will not force a farmer to
cease production if the family liviig expenses and equipment
replacement expenditures are decreased in order to assure that
creditors are paid their interest. Fourth, persons with cash needs in
200. For a discussion of depreciation, see supra note 199 and accompanying text. An alternative
to including only a portion of depreciation in this definition of cost of production would be to include
all depreciation as a cost, but then require a principal payment to the lender who holds the debts on
the depreciable assets. The amount of payment would be the total amount of depreciation multiplied
by the portion ofdepreciable assets that;3 encumbered.
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excess of the average farmer will need to restructure their business
in order to increase their efficiency and make their principal
payments. Fifth, regardless of farmer's level of efficiency, the
business should cease production when its revenue is not adequate
to pay variable costs. Finally, an ability to meet cash obligations,
even if it requires reducing family living expenses and equipment
expenditures, demonstrates that the business should survive a
temporary downswing in the industry.
Regardless of the cost of production that is adopted, it is
probably desirable to have information concerning the cost of
production based on a regional level rather than on a state-wide
basis. 201 Since production levels vary greatly from region to
region, 20 2 it would be inequitable to assume that a farm'product
produced in the western part of North Dakota would have a cost of
production similar to the same product produced in the eastern part
of North Dakota. 
203
C. IN COMPARISON TO OTHER COMMODITIES IN GENERAL,
ENTERING INTO THE.BUSINESS OF AGRICULTURE
The language "in comparison to other commodities in
general, entering into the business of agriculture" 20 4 poses some of
the most difficult questions of the confiscatory price statutes. The
language appears to be a key requirement in determining whether
section 28-29-04 is triggered and yet its meaning is perhaps least
understood. 20 5 Consequently, this clause may form the core of an
argument that section 28-29-04 is unconstitutionally vague. 20 6 For
the purpose of this discussion, the clause will be divided after the
word "general," with the second phrase being addressed first.
201. Butsee Federal Land Bank v. Ostlie, Civ. No. 36928, mem. op. at 7-8 (N.E. Cent. Dist. Ct.
N.D. Oct. 19, 1983) (suggesting cost of production figures should be based on economic studies
applicable to the state).
202. R. JOHNSON, M. ALI, D. SAXOWSKY & R. LITTLE, COST OF PRODUCING, FARM COMMODITIES
IN NORTH DAKOTA (Agricultural Economics Report No. 90, Department of Agricultural Economics,
North Dakota State University, 1986).
203. Two related issues are identifying which commodities the court should consider and which
year's (or years') prices and costs are relevant. By considering commodities generally produced in
the county or region of the state where the debtor's farm is located, the court continues to focus upon
the economic situation of a typical farmer. This is more relevant to the issue of the overall condition
of North Dakota's agriculture than are the commodities produced by the indebted farmer. In terms
of time, current prices and costs are most relevant since an underlying question is whether a delay ir
repayment at the time of the producing will benefit the producer. Past costs and revenues have littl
bearing on current or future production costs and income.
204. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of § 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
205. See id.
206. For a discussion of vagueness, see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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1. Entering into the Business ofAgriculture
An initial question is whether "entering into the business of
agriculture" modifies "cost of production" or "in comparison to
other commodities in general. ' 20 7 The comma after "general"
would indicate that the phrase modifies "cost of production."
Consequently, the phrase would be an explicit statement as to
which items should be considered in calculating the cost of
production; that is, those inputs that are used in the production of
agricultural commodities.
An alternative interpretation would be that the phrase
modifies "in comparison to other commodities in general."
Pursuant to this interpretation "entering into the business of
agriculture" would describe what "other commodities" should be
used to complete the comparison required by section 28-29-04.2o8
2. In Comparison to Other Commodities in General
Interpreting "in comparison to other commodities in general"
raises three questions: (1) what are the "other commodities"; (2) to
what should the price of these "other commodities" be compared;
and (3) what is the criteria for determining the outcome of the
comparison.
The answer to the first question is apparent if it is accepted
that "entering into agriculture" modifies "other commodities." In
that case, "other commodities" are the inputs used in the
production of grain and livestock. If, however, it is accepted that
''entering into agriculture" modifies "cost of production," the
definition of "other commodities" is not easily discerned. Possible
meanings for "other commodities" include the following: (1) other
North Dakota agricultural commodities; (2) nonagricultural
commodities in North Dakota; (3) major agricultural commodities
for a multistate region or the nation; or (4) nonagricultural
commodities for a multistate region or the nation.
Defining "other commodities" as North Dakota agricultural
commodities would be unnecessary because section 28-29-04
already provides that the price of all farm products produced in the
state are to be considered. 20 9 Moreover, interpreting "other
commodities" to mean nonagricultural commodities for a
multistate region or the nation would be illogical because those
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commodities bear no relation to the agricultural or general
economy of North Dakota. Thus, the probable meaning of "other
commodities" is the second or third alternative.
The second question is to what should the price of these "other
commodities" be compared. Section 28-29-04 already requires a
comparison of farm prices to the cost of production. 210 The statute
is triggered whenever the ratio of farm prices to cost of production
(price/cost ratio) is less than one. 211 The phrase "in comparison to
other commodities in general" suggests that a second comparison is
to be made. This second comparison would involve "the price of
other commodities" and another value. Section 28-29-04 does not
indicate what this "other value" is or how it should be determined,
but there are some possible alternatives. 21 2 First, the price of other
commodities could be compared to the price/cost ratio of farm
commodities. 213 Second, the price of other commodities could be
examined against their cost of production. Third, the price of other
commodities could be compared to the price of farm products in
North Dakota. Finally, the price/cost ratio of other commodities
could be compared to the price/cost ratio for North Dakota
agricultural products. This last suggestion may be most sensible if
"other commodities" is defined as nonagricultural commodities in
North Dakota because it would compare the profitability of North
Dakota agriculture to the profitability of other segments of the
state's economy.
21 4
The third question regarding the phrase "in comparison to
other commodities in general" is what determines the outcome of
the comparison. In addition to a price/cost ratio for North Dakota
agricultural products of less than one, must this ratio be less
favorable than the "price of other commodities" in order to invoke
section 28-29-04,21-5 or is the statute triggered when the "price of
other commodities" also has a cost/price ratio of less than one?
Section 28-29-04 does not suggest an answer.
216
An alternative to answering all these questions would be to
accept that "entering into the business of agriculture" describes
210. Id.
211. See id. 17
212. See id.
213. Comparing the absolute price of the "other commodities" to a price/cost ratio would, of
'course, be meaningless unless there is historical data to indicate how this comparison has changed.
214. Section 28-29-06 of the North Dakota Century Code directs courts to take notice of the
situation of producers and laborers. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-06 (1974). For the text of § 28-29-06,
see supra note 4. If this includes nonagricultural laborers, S 28-29-06 supports the idea that the
comparison should be between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors of the North Dakota
economy. See id.




"other commodities." Next, interpret "in comparison' to mean
"considering," and use the information about the "price of other
commodities" in the estimation of cost of production. The most
persistent question, however, may be whether this clause is
unconstitutionally vague.
217
D. BEST INTEREST OF LITIGANTS
Although the first sentence of section 28-29-04 grants state
courts added discretion as long as the price of farm commodities
does not at least equal the cost of production, the court must
exercise this discretion in the "best interests of litigants."
'218
Consequently, a relevant issue is what should be considered in
determining whether a delay is in the best interests of the parties.
Although section 28-29-04 permits courts to delay legal actions
for debt collections, 219 the statute does not allow courts to delay
payment indefinitely, nor terminate or reduce the debtor's
obligation. 220 Since the debtor's obligation cannot be reduced,
interest on the debt will accrue during any court imposed delay.
Thus, a delay in repayment will not unequiVocally be in the best
financial interest of the parties.
Delinquent borrowers benefit economically from a delay in
repayment only if the income earned on the property that is
retained as a result of the postponement exceeds the cost of securing
the delay. Since revenue from farm property depends on the season
of the year, a three month delay in foreclosing farm land during the
winter may not generate any income for the farmer. Accruing
interest will definitely exceed the income in such a situation.
Similarly, a delay for an entire year is not beneficial to the borrower
if the annual interest cost exceeds earnings. An indebted farmer,
217. For a discussion of vagueness, see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the severance of an unconstitutional clause from a statute, see supra notes 90-92 and
accompanying text.
218. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of 5 28-29-04, see supra note 4. While
28-29-04 requires state courts to exercise their discretion in the best interests of the parties, 5 28-29-
05 requires that a court-imposed delay in a foreclosure proceeding be "advisable and just." Id. 5 28-
29-05. This is probably a less stringent standard from the debtor's perspective than "for the best
interests of the litigants." See id. §§28-29-04 and -05.
219. See Federal Land Bank v. Halverson, 392 N.W.2d 77, 82 (N.D. 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE §
28-29-04 (1974). In Halverson, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that forebearance pursuant to
the confiscatory price statutes means some delay in enforcing the debtor's obligation by the exercise
of restraint and patience. Halverson, 392 N.W.2d at 82.
220. Folmer v. State, 346 N.W.2d 731, 734 (N.D. 1984). In Folmer the North Dakota Supreme
Court noted that courts, in applying the confiscatory price statutes, could not force a mortgagee to
accept less than the amount due under the mortgage or determine that the mortgagee was released
from making further payments. Id. at 735.
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however, is likely to benefit economically from a delay that extends
for only the growing season.
Whether or not a delay in repayment is economically
beneficial to the borrower may not be determinative of whether
forebearance granted pursuant to section 28-29-04 is in the best
interests of the parties. 22t Nonmonetary interests of borrowers,
such as a place to live, should also be considered in determining
whether forbearance is in the best interests of the parties.
Furthermore, the impact the delay would have on creditors must be
considered.222
E. ANY CAUSE
The breadth of cases in which section 28-29-04 can be invoked
is limited to "any cause. '"223 Although section 28-29-04 offers no
explicit indication that it applies only to debtor-creditor
relationships, the North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that the
statute should "be liberally construed to protect the interest of the
debtor-mortgagor." 224
Another indication as to the breadth of the statute is provided
by section 28-29-06, which authorizes state courts to "take judicial
notice of the situation of producers and laborers when prices of
farm products are confiscatory. ' '225 Assuming that laborers are not
limited to farm workers, the confiscatory price statutes appear to be
available to persons outside agriculture.
226
221. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of 5 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
222. A question related to what constitutes the best interests of the parties is whether courts will
require a debtor to pay interest on the debt that accrues subsequent to the granting of forebearance
during the perod of the delay. Clearly, the principal portion of the debt and interest that accrued
prior to delay will not need to be paid during forebearance. The North Dakota Supreme Court has
stated, however, that judicial forebearance pursuant to the confiscatory price statutes might depend
on appropriate conditions, such as using rental payments made by a debtor to pay real estate taxes or
a portion of the debt. Federal Land Bank v. Thomas, 386 N.W.2d 29, 31 n.1 (N.D. 1986); see
Halverson, 392 N.W.2d at 82. This statement seems to suggest that there may be cases in which
payment of some interest accruing during the delay also may be postponed.
223. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04 (1974). Section 28-29-04 provides that, when the requisite
conditions are met, state courts can extend deadlines for the filing and serving of papers "necessary
for the final determination of any cause." Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court has recognized that
the deadlines for filing and serving papers might be extended on appeal pursuant to 5 28-29-04. Lang
v. Bank of North Dakota, 377 N.W.2d 575, 580 (N.D. 1985); see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04
(1974). Thus, it appears that "final determination" may include the appellate process. For the text
of S 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
224. Folmer, 346 N.W.2d at 733. In Folmer the court also noted that § 28-29-04 was applicable to
any cause. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04 (1974). The court, however, refused to speculate
about the various fact situations in which the statute would apply. Folmer, 346 N.W.2d at 733.
Moreover, the court stated that § 28-29-04 was not limited to cases dealing specifically with the sale
of agricultural commodities, and that the statute was applicable to any cause in which the factors
specified in § 28-29-04 were present. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of
28-29-04, see supra note 4.
225. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-06 (1974). For the text of § 28-29-06, see suprh note 4.
226. Perhaps one agrument that could be advanced to defeat an overly expansive interpretation
of "any cause" would be, pursuant to § 28-29-04, delay of the legal proceeding is not in the best.
CONFISCATORY PRICE LAWS
F. IN LIKE MANNER
The second sentence of section 28-29-04 empowers state courts
"in like manner" to delay, among other items, entry of
judgment. 227 Obviously, some requirement specified in the first
sentence has been incorporated into the second sentence. Accepting
that each sentence in section 28-29-04 specifies a distinct defense
allows an interpretation of "in like manner." Since the court's
authority to act and the conditions under which it is empowered to
use this authority are detailed in the second sentence of section 28-
29-04, "in like manner" is not referring to the authority and
conditions specified in the first sentence of section 28-29-04.228
Therefore, "in like manner" must incorporate "for the best
interests of litigants" into the second sentence of section 28-29-04
as the standard for exercising the court's discretion. 22 9 Accepting
this interpretation indicates that a court stay would not be
automatic upon a showing that legal procedure would confiscate
property by forcing a sale of agricultural products.
G. CONFISCATE OR TEND TO CONFISCATE
Section 28-29-04 allows courts to stay various activities if strict
legal proceeding would "confiscate or tend to confiscate the
property of " the parties. 230 Confiscation is generally defined as an
action in which the government acquires ownership of property,
often without payment. 231 Since application of the confiscatory
price statutes is not limited to situations in which government is a
party to the action, confiscatory must have meaning other than its
technical definition for the purpose of this law. Furthermore, a
forced sale of agricultural products as well as foreclosure of a
mortgage will involve a payment, although it may be a reduced
payment. Therefore, confiscation for the purpose of the
confiscatory price statutes must be a diminished payment. The
ensuing issue, however, will be how extensive the decrease in
selling price must be in order to consider the transaction
confiscatory. The North Dakota Supreme Court appears to imply
that a price below the cost of production would be confiscatory.
232
interests of both parties. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04 (1974). For a discussion of what constitutes
the best interests of the parties, see supra notes 218-22 and accompanying text.




231. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 560 (2d ed. 1947).
232. See Folmer v. State, 346 N.W.2d 731, 733 (N.D. 1984) (stating first sentence of 5 28-29-04
applies when farm prices are confiscatory).
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Perhaps this suggests that confiscation, as used in the confiscatory
price statutes, is merely a way of describing costs in excess of price.
H. RUINOUS
The second sentence of section 28-29-04 provides state courts
with authority to delay various court activities if strict legal
procedure would confiscate the property of the litigant "by forcing
the sale of agricultural products upon a ruinous market.' '233
Ruinous, according to the dictionary, is defined as bringing or
tending to bring ruin, destruction, or harm. 234 A disastrous market
is a relative term because what is ruinous to a seller may be
beneficial to a buyer. Several North Dakota Supreme Court
opinions refer to the economic situation of the 1930s,2 3 5 and
perhaps that period of history is an example of a ruinous market.
On the other hand, "ruinous" as used in section 28-29-04 may be a
descriptive term rather than a statement of substantive law.
236
Accordingly, the relation between cost of production and the price
of farm products, despite its inherent definitional problem, is a
more exact measure than "ruinous" and therefore, should be used
in determining whether the law is triggered.
237
I. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
The second sentence of section 28-29-04 appears to provide
state courts with discretionary authority when legal procedure
would confiscate property "by forcing the sale of agricultural
products upon a ruinous market." 238 The North Dakota Supreme
Court, however, determined in Heidt v. State239 that a debtor was
not required to own agricultural products, at the time of a hearing
to enjoin foreclosure by advertisement, to invoke the confiscatory
price defense.24 0  The court noted that the purpose of the
233. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of § 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
234. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2182 (2d ed. 1947).
235. E.g., Lang v. Bank of North Dakota, 377 N.W.2d 575, 580 (N.D. 1985) (noting parallels
between present economic conditions and those in the 1930s); Folmer, 346 N.W.2d at 732 (referring
to agricultural economy during 1930s).
236. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of S 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
237. For a discussion of the price of farm products and the cost of production, see supra notes
164-203 and accompanying text.
238. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of S 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
239. 372 N.W.2d 857 (N.D. 1985).
240. Heidt v. State, 372 N.W.2d 857, 861 (N.D. 1985); see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04 (1974);
id. 5 35-22-04 (1980) (after expiration of the period provided by notice of intention to foreclose an
order enjoining foreclosure will only be made by motion); see also Federal Land Bank v. Thomas, 386
N.W.2d 29, 31 n. 1 (N.D. 1986) (debtor need not own agricultural commodities). For the text of
28-29-04, see supra note 4.
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confiscatory price defense was to aid farmers and to require farmers
to possess agricultural commodities might violate the intent of the
statute.24 1 The court reasoned that if the cost of production actually
exceeded the price of farm products, the farmer would probably be
forced to sell any commodities that were once owned.
24 2
Since the court in Heidt stated only that agricultural products
need not be owned at the time a case is heard, agricultural products
must be defined. 243 One interpretation could be that agricultural
products encompasses only items such as wheat and grain, while a
broader interpretation could include farm machinery or
equipment. The answer may influence the elements that a debtor
must prove to be granted a delay pursuant to the confiscatory price
statutes.
VIII. IS THERE ANOTHER INTERPRETATION?
With all the uncertainties that surround the confiscatory price
statutes, it may be appropriate to inquire whether the statutes, if
viewed from another perspective, could have an alternative
meaning. One district court has stated that the confiscatory price
laws are "not a question of vagueness but of ambiguity.
' 2 44
Accepting this as a premise, the next logical step is to examine the
legislative intent to determine how the statutes should be
interpreted.24 5 Consequently, it is necessary to briefly review the
agricultural and legal situation at the time the confiscatory price
statutes were passed.
24 6
The confiscatory price laws were enacted several months after
the 1932 crop had been harvested. Historical data indicates that
241. Heidt, 372 N.W.2d at 861; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of S 28-29-
04, see supra note 4.
242. Heidt, 372 N.W.2d at 861. Heidt determined that ownership of farm commodities is not
necessary to invoke S 28-29-04. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-29-04 (1974). However, in Production
Credit Ass'n v. Lund, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that a reasonable interpretation of § 28-
29-04 was that courts could act pursuant to the statute when "legal procedure will result in the
confiscation of property 'by forcing the sale of agricultural products upon a ruinous market.' "
Production Credit Ass'n v. Lund, 389 N.W.2d 585, 587 (N.D. 1986). This implies that possession
and a forced sale of agricultural products are requisite conditions to applying the statute. In
reconciling these two opinions, however, Heidt should be granted greater deference because the court
was addressing whether ownership of farm commodities was necessary, whereas the question in Lund
was whether S 28-29-04 had repealed by its own terms. Compare Lund, 389 N.W.2d at 587 (whether S
28-29-04 self-terminated) with Heidt, 372 N.W.2d at 861 (whether ownership of commodities is
necessary).
243. Heidt, 372 N.W.2d at 861.
244. United Bank v. Martineson, Civ. No. 34137, mem. op. at 1 (S.Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. Aug.
29, 1984).
245. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-02-39 (1975) (if statute is ambiguous court may consider, among
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North Dakota farmers owned approximately 600,000 horses and
draft animals. 247  Furthermore, less than half of the farmers
reported owning tractors, while more than ninety percent reported
owning draft animals.2 48 Statutory law guided court procedure
because the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure would not be
adopted for twenty-five years. 24 9 It was within this setting that the
confiscatory price statutes were adopted.
A. THE-FIRST SENTENCE
The first sentence of section 28-29-04 empowers state courts
with authority "to extend the time for serving and filing all papers
requisite and necessary for the final determination of any cause"
whenever the price of agricultural products does not at least equal
the cost of production. 250 Arguably, this language implies that the
time period for filing answers, motions, and responses may be
extended at the court's discretion. The apparent legislative intent
was to protect parties from an adverse judicial ruling based on a
technicality, such as missing a filing deadline. The corollary would
be that the 1933 North Dakota Legislature desired foreclosure cases
to be decided on their merits rather than on a procedural aspect.
With the foregoing in mind, the first sentence of section 28-29-
04 should apply to any proceeding to foreclose a mortgage on a crop
as well as on real or personal property. 251 This breadth is reflected
by the statutory reference to "any cause. ' 252 This sentence,
however, would apply only to the initial stages of litigation, and
would have no relevance once the proceeding entered the trial
stage.
B. THE-SECOND SENTENCE
The second sentence of section 28-29-04 explicitly grants
courts authority to delay entering a judgment, issuing an
247. U.S. BUREAU OF THE. CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 16TH UNITED STATES CENSUS OF
AGRICULTURE, NORTH DAKOTA, USES OF LAND, PRINCIPAL CROPS AND CLASSES OF LIVESTOCK WITH
STATISTICS FOR COUNTIES 8 (1st ser. 1941). [hereinafter USES OF LAND CENSUS]. The total number of
mules, colts and horses in North Dakota dropped from 664,536 in 1930 to 565,860 in 1935. Id.
248. BUREAU OF THE. CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 16TH .UNITED STATES CENSUS OF
AGRICULTURE, NORTH DAKOTA, FARM MORTGAGES, TAXES, LABOR FACILITIES EXPENDITURES, AND
MISCELLANEOUS FARM INFORMATION; FRUITS, VEGETABLES AND MINOR CROPS WITH STATISTICS FOR
COUNTIES 11 (2d ser. 1941). Data indicates that 43.8% of the approximately 77,950 North Dakota
farmers owned tractors in 1930, whereas 71,864 farmers owned horses. Id.; see USES -OF LAND
CENSUS, supra note 245 at 8.
249. N.D. CENT. CODE, note to North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure 1 (1974). The North
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated pursuant to an order of the North Dakota
Supreme Court on April 25, 1957. Id.





execution, or signing an order for judgment if the legal proceeding
would confiscate property of a party by "forcing a sale of
agricultural products upon a ruinous market.' '253 The use of
"agricultural products" implies that to invoke the second sentence
of section 28-29-04, there must be a forced sale of agricultural
products such as crops and livestock, rather than a forced sale of
land or capital assets.2 54 Suggesting that the debtor must own
agricultural products does not conflict with the North Dakota
Supreme Court's statement that ownership of agricultural products
is not necessary to utilize section 28-29-04 if the first sentence is
interpreted to apply to any cause. 255
Moreover, the explicit language of the statute suggests that the
two sentences contained in section 28-29-04 provide the court with
different alternatives.2 56 While the first sentence allows the court to
extend time for serving and filing papers, it does not explicitly
permit the court to delay entry of judgment.2 57 Arguably, such
authority should not be implied since section 28-29-04 specifically
provides the court's authority pursuant to each sentence. 25 8
The second sentence of section 28-29-04 should be applied
only to crop mortgages and other encumbrances upon actual
produce.2 59 It is primarily available once the legal proceeding has
reached the merits of the case.
C. THE-THIRD SENTENCE
Section 28-29-05 applies in foreclosure cases. 2 60 The emphasis
of section 28-29-05 is on real estate mortgage foreclosures, since its
application is triggered when an order for judgment would deprive
a debtor of a home and confiscate the debtor's property.2 6' The
legislature probably emphasized real estate because it was more
vital than farm equipment at the time the confiscatory price statutes
253. Id.
254. See id.
255. See Heidt v. State, 372 N.W.2d 857, 861 (N.D. 1985) (debtor is not required to own farm
commodities to raise confisacatory price defense); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04 (1974). For a
discussion of Heidt, see supra notes 239-42. For the text of S 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
256. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of § 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
257. See id.
258. See Wills v. Schroeder Aviation Inc., 390 N.W.2d 544, 546 (N.D. 1986) (when a statute is
clear the letter of the statute can not be disregarded under the pretext of following the spirit of the
law); Haggard v. Meier, 368 N.W.2d 539, 542 (N.D. 1985) (when a statute is clear it is improper for
courts to add provisions which the words of the statute do not provide); N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-01-05
(1975) (when a statute is clear and free from ambiguity the words of the statute are not to be
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit).
259. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04 (1974). For the text of S 28-29-04, see supra note 4.
260. Id. § 28-29-05. For the text of 5 28-29-05, see supra note 4.
261. Id.
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were enacted. Foreclosure of a land mortgage meant an end to the
farm business, a place to live, and an opportunity to raise food for
the family. Loss of equipment did not cause such drastic
consequences because it could be replaced with a combination of
draft animals and human labor. Therefore, the legislature sensibly
emphasized real estate; it was not aware that personal property
would become such an essential element to the successful operation
of a farm business.
Section 28-29-05 is similar to the second sentence of section
28-29-04 because it applies only after reaching the trial stage of
iitigation. 262 This conclusion is supported by the language of
section 28-29-05 which permits a court oi iy to delay the signing of
an order for judgment. 263 Thus, section 28-29-05 could be
interpreted as applying only in real estate foreclosure cases once the
proceeding reached the merits of the case.
264
IX. CONCLUSION
The objective of this Article was to identify some of the many
issues which surround the confiscatory price statutes. Although
enacted over fifty years ago, the statutes' application was limited
during periods of agricultural prosperity. Now, however, with the
agricultural economy in distressful condition, numerous questions
surrounding the confiscatory price statutes are being raised for the
first time. These range from the statutes' constitutionality to
appropriate definitions for terms contained in the statutes. Perhaps
legislative amendment is the best solution for the problems raised
by these statutes, which have been antiquated by technological
advances, changed circumstances, and lack of revision during the
past fifty-four years.
262. See id.
263. Id.
264. See id.
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